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ABSTRACT 
 
Developments in the delivery of agricultural credit during the collective era, 1950 to 
1978 is poorly understudied and poorly understood. In this thesis, I examine and 
provide an economic assessment of the political movements and developments in rural 
finance in China from 1950 to 1978/1984 with the latter date capturing the interim 
period before modern reforms took place. To examine the influencing factors of 
provincial agricultural loans,  this thesis models agricultural loans from 1950 to 1984 
as a function of natural disasters, grain output and 5 historical policy dummies. 
Interestingly, establishments of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Rural 
Credit Cooperatives (RCC), occurrence of the Great Leap Forward and two stages of 
the Cultural Revolution. My objective is to determine whether, and to what effect, 
these factors influenced agricultural credit. Using data collected from local gazetteers 
at the provincial and city levels, this preliminary assessments shows that these events 
and circumstances had significant impacts on rural credit. I find, for example, that the 
relationship between loan outstanding and interest rates is downward sloping which 
indicates what I refer to as a ‘demand dominant’ dynamic,  that is shifts in supply 
along the credit demand curve has a much stronger impact on loan balances (a quasi-
equilibrium) than shifts in demand along the supply/marginal cost curve. But I also 
show, for example that the change of steel output imposed a negative effect on RCC 
loans during the Great Leap Forward. Although RCC loans increased during this 
period this result suggests that the rate of growth in rural credit was dampened by the 
push for iron. In furtherance to this I show a significant increase in the deposit to loan 
ratio which suggests a form of red-lining in which rural deposits were not reinvested 
in rural loans but diverted towards non agricultural uses. Last not least, the 
documentation of contemporaneous living and economic conditions reported in the 
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local financial gazetteers provide interesting and valuable stories and insights into  
agriculture credit in China. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The 28 years following the end of China’s War of Independence – a period I will refer to as the 
‘collective era’ - saw the deconstruction of many traditional credit institutions for agriculture 
that had developed during the Republican Era, 1912-1949. The collective era brought about 
policies in land reforms in which all land became the property of the government. With the 
elimination of land title and property rights, agricultural transformation centered on the 
amalgamation of farm lands into worker collectives. These collectives dominated the 
agricultural landscape until 1978 with the introduction of the Rural Household Responsibility 
System. By 1984 the market-oriented reforms of Deng Xiaoping were affirmed, and with this 
affirmation came regulatory reforms in agricultural credit. I will refer to the period between 
1978 and 1984 as a transitory phase, and the period following 1984 as the Modern Era. While 
much has been written on agricultural credit in the modern era, less is known about 
developments in agricultural credit before that. Fu and Turvey (2018) detail the history of 
agricultural credit during the reconstruction period and war years of the Republican era 1912-
1949, as well as developments in agricultural credit in the years and centuries prior to the end 
of the Qing in the 1911 revolution but structural changes and development of agricultural 
credit during the collective era is poorly documented are largely unknown. This thesis 
remedies this by providing some baseline insights into the financial development of 
agricultural credit during this period and the transitory phase that follows. Although I do 
present some aspects of rural credit in the modern era (see Chapter 5) this is cursory and 
provided more as an epilogue to the earlier developments, which constitute the focus of this 
thesis. 
As mentioned, the developments in agricultural credit during the collective era, 1950 to 1978 
are  poorly understood, and have largely been ignored by present-day scholars. Yet this era is 
the epitome of a centrally planned economy, and understanding it better can bring into contrast 
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the market orientation that followed. It oversaw the deconstruction of the financial institutions 
including credit cooperatives and formal banks such as the Farmers’ Bank of China (1935) 
developed under the Rural Reconstruction (1928- 1937) and the Farm Credit Bureau (1936) 
(Fu and Turvey 2018), and essentially started over with the only remnants remaining being the 
need for a policy bank (the Agricultural Bank of China) and the revitalization of rural credit 
cooperatives. 
The developments of agricultural credit institutions during this collective era has not, to my 
knowledge, been detailed to the extent that this thesis does. In this thesis I examine the 
evolution of credit supply and demand during the period 1950 to 1984. Relying on obscure 
notations and data summaries from local gazetteers I describe the role of agricultural credit in 
China’s economic development.  In addition to detailing the specifics of agricultural credit in 
terms of institutions (supply) and agricultural use (demand), I also provide insights into the 
impact of the Great Leap Forward (1957-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1971, 1971-
1976) on agricultural credit. 
One of the difficulties in the empirical investigation of credit is that the observable variable is 
(as in my case) total credit outstanding. This value is endogenously determined by supply and 
demand, neither of which is observable. Because changes in marginal utilities in the demand 
side, marginal costs on the supply side or exogenous shocks to either cannot be observed I 
assume a ‘quasi equilibrium’ and develop the economics accordingly. Consequently, little 
work has been done on understanding the demand for agricultural credit in China. Fu and 
Turvey (20181; Chapter 6, see also Turvey and Fu (20192) in Hu, Zhong and Turvey (2019, 
Chapter 11) use John Lossing Buck’s primary household data and show that by and large 
farmers were ‘price takers’ when it came to credit demand. During the mid-Republican era and 
                                                 
1 See: Fu, H., & Turvey, C. G. (2018). The Evolution of Agricultural Credit During China’s Republican Era, 1912–
1949. Springer. 
2 See: Hu, H., Zhong, F., & Turvey, C. G. (2019) Chinese Agriculture in the 1930s Investigations into John Lossing 
Buck’s Rediscovered ‘Land Utilization in China’ Microdata. Springer. 
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the areas studied by Buck in Land Utilization in China (1937)1 formal credit institutions were 
virtually non-existent, including credit societies or cooperatives. Turvey and Fu show some 
downward elasticity in credit demand for production use, but  perfectly inelastic demand for 
special expenditures such as weddings and funerals; the greater the loan demanded, the higher 
the interest rate charged. In the modern era Turvey et al (2012) and Verteramo-Chiu et al 
(2014) have shown using experimental and quasi-experimental techniques that the demand for 
credit is not highly inelastic, and for many farmers elastic. What the nature of demand is for 
the collective era is, however, unknown. I fill this gap in understanding by showing that in 
terms of credit demand and supply, the credit market was demand dominant. In other words, 
the credit demand was downward sloping and demand responses were likely due to shifts in 
supply along the demand curve, than shifts in demand along the supply curve (as found by 
Turvey and Fu). 
 
1.2.Historical Background 
The history from 1950 to 1984 in China is remarkable and profound. In those 34 years, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) established and launched 6 national 5-Year Plans 2  to 
transfer China from a traditional agricultural country to an industrial country. The Great Leap 
Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution deeply shaped politics and economics of 
China in many aspects. The annual compound growth rate of Primary Industry was 6.2% while 
that for agricultural loans was 15% from 1952 to 1984. From 1950 to 1984, the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC) encountered 4 establishments and 3 revocations and Rural Credit 
                                                 
1  Buck, J. L. (1937). Land Utilization in China: A Study of 16,786 Farms in 168 Localities, and 38,256 Farm 
Familites in Twenty-two Provinces in China, 1929-1933--Statistics (Vol. 2). Commercial Press, Limited, Agents in 
the United States, The University of Chicago Press. 
2 The first 5-Year Plan was launched in 1953 and was concentrated on industrialization accelerate socialist 
transformation in economic fields. The second 5-Year Plan was launched in 1958 and divided into two stages: the 
Great Leap Forward movement from 1958 to 1960 and the adjustment period from 1961 to 1962. The third 5-Year 
Plan was launched in 1966 and concentrated on national defense. The fourth 5-Year Plan was launched in 1971 and 
was concreted on the Third-line construction and agricultural mechanization. The fifth Five-Year Plan was launched 
in 1976 and aimed to realize agricultural mechanization by 1980. The sixth Five-Year Plan was launched in 1981 
and continued to implement the policy of “Adjustment, Reform, Rectification and Improvement”. 
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Cooperatives (RCC) used to be decentralized to the credit division of People’s commune. 
Agricultural credit development and policies are inevitably affected by historical movements. 
Agricultural credit is a tool of resources allocation, which might affect the structure of China 
Economy (Yang Dong, & Guo Yuqing, 2007). Agricultural credit has also played an important 
role in helping farmers1  achieve prosperity. With the support of rural credit, farmers can 
expand agricultural production and solve difficulties in life. Rural Credit includes agricultural 
loans, Rural Credit Cooperatives loans, farmer loans and other loans. In the modern era the 
main supplier of agricultural credit is the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCC). Both financial institutions are managed by the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC). RCC was at times a subsidiary of ABC which, as a policy bank before privatization in 
1996 specialized in issuing loans to farmers, Town and Village Enterprises (TVE), and rural 
economic development. 
The precursor to modern financial institutions were, as indicated, the ABC and credit 
cooperatives. Looking back to data recorded in local financial gazetteers, more interesting 
stories about agricultural credit are revealed. Table 1-1 shows farmer loans per capita in 6 
provinces from 1954 to 1984. Farmer loans per capita hovered around 1 or 2 yuan until 1978, 
which showed stagnation of farmer loans during a long period of time (note: these data also 
include zero-loan data and are more indicative than absolute). The shortage of funds of formal 
financial institutions and the imperfect function of rural financial services have become an 
important factor restricting the development of agriculture and rural areas. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Farmers refer to those who have agricultural household registration (Hukou in Chinese), mainly engaged in rural 
land cultivation or other rural-related production and operation activities, such as farmers, self-employed 
households. 
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Table 1-1 Farmer Loans per capita in 6 provinces from 1954 to 1984 
Year Hubei Henan Jiangsu Liaoning Sichuan Yunnan Heilongjiang 
1954     0.07 0.24  
1955     0.23 0.68  
1956   1.26  0.65 1.02  
1957 1.25  0.97  0.56 1.12  
1958 2.19  1.44  0.77 1.33 0.73 
1959 2.14  0.98 1.75 0.88 1.13 1.09 
1960 1.69  1.38 1.80 0.82 1.74 1.16 
1961 1.45  1.13 1.78 0.60 1.42 0.85 
1962 1.55  1.11 1.43 0.64 1.15 0.76 
1963 2.13 1.59 1.01 1.47 0.87 1.19 0.41 
1964 2.22 1.11 1.02 1.70 1.13 1.67 1.95 
1965 2.15 1.13 1.21 2.09 1.20 1.69 1.43 
1966 2.55 1.12 1.26 2.25 1.53 1.75 2.04 
1967 2.35 1.24 1.26 2.38 1.75 1.63 1.99 
1968 2.37 1.26 1.16 2.39 1.71 1.96 1.96 
1969 2.37 1.33 1.13 2.49 1.71 1.99 2.31 
1970 2.32 1.31 1.19 2.37 1.60 2.04 2.12 
1971 2.06 1.23 0.93 2.10 1.60 2.04 2.17 
1972 2.03 1.21 0.89 2.14 1.56 2.41 2.17 
1973 2.01 1.14 0.73 1.91 1.43 2.20 1.90 
1974 2.09 1.11 0.81 1.78 1.39 2.28 1.85 
1975 2.23 1.06 0.74 1.62 1.48 2.27 1.65 
1976 2.18 1.04 0.70 1.70 1.83 2.25 1.75 
1977 2.23 1.04 0.68 1.54 1.59 2.23 1.70 
1978 2.11 1.53 0.66 1.42 1.55 2.23 1.52 
1979 2.32 3.50 0.56 1.35 1.44 2.35 1.37 
1980 2.84 5.94 0.60 1.59 2.57 3.20 1.35 
1981 4.04 8.79 0.45 2.21 3.01 4.87 1.83 
1982 7.15 22.99 0.85 3.76 5.90 8.61 3.20 
1983 19.84 25.03 2.84 9.11 11.96 15.95 5.00 
1984 19.85 34.87 10.93 30.41 21.97 31.60 18.98 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
 
In this thesis I collect and analyze formal and informal finance data from local gazetteers at 
provincial and city levels, The overall objective of this thesis is to examine and document the 
development of credit institutions during the collective era 1950 to 1978 from a macro and 
historical perspective, and to provide a better understanding of the economics of agricultural 
finance to China's economic development. More specifically the objectives of this thesis are to: 
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1. To sort out the historical development of Agricultural Bank of China(ABC) and Rural 
Credit Cooperatives(RCC) from 1950 to 1984 and introduce the effect of policies on 
formal rural finance during that period of time.  
2. To carry out agricultural credit analysis both on provincial level and city level by using 
financial gazetteers data collected from Wan Fang Database1.  
3. To carry out a quantitative demand/supply analysis on formal and informal loans based on 
the National Rural fixed observation survey data.  
4. To analyze features of farmer loans from 1979 to 1989 based on China Rural Finance 
Yearbook2.  
With these objectives in place, the outcome of this thesis is a balance between economic 
history, applied economics and agricultural finance. As previously mentioned this thesis 
contributes to the academic literature by providing an original assessment of agricultural credit 
during the collective era, and with greater depth than has previously been found in the 
literature. Much of what is presented here is derived from local gazetteers that recorded  
contemporaneous events and circumstances in local China (Chapter 2). Data summaries were 
also found in gazetteers. These data were summarized and analyzed. I am unaware of any 
previous research using this data. To capture major events such as the Great Leap Forward and 
the Cultural Revolution I used a variety of econometric techniques, taking care to identify 
exogenous factors such as drought or floods (Chapters 3 and 4). Credit demand and supply is 
investigated using records of interest rates throughout the collective era. The conflict between 
agricultural and industrial development is captured by separate regressions that relate the 
effects of iron demand on agricultural credit. Interestingly, we find an inverse relationship 
between iron demand and agricultural credit. Since agricultural credit was generally increasing 
                                                 
1 Wanfang Data is a large-scale online database covering journals, conference summaries, papers, academic 
achievements and academic conference papers. See: http://www.wanfangdata.com.cn/index.html. 
2 China Rural Finance Yearbook was Published by China Statistical Publishing House, 1992. 
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throughout the collective era, this result suggests that the demand for industrial iron, may have 
actually dampened the supply of credit, which in turn suggests that agricultural output may 
have been lower than its economic potential had it been able to develop without the resource 
misallocation observed during the Great Leap Forward. Chapter 5 explores data obtained for 
the modern era and provides an account of changes in the growth and distribution of rural 
credit between 1985 and 2009 as a point of comparison. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I review recent developments in the theory and study of agricultural credit 
markets. The first part is the review of credit supply theory and credit supply in rural China. 
The second part is about the credit demand from various aspects. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
In this paper, the measure is the amount of agricultural debt outstanding which is the quasi-
equilibrium balance of demand and supply. Here, I assume supply is equal to demand and the 
supply curve and demand curve are as follows: 
 Supply Curve: i=a+α*L     (equation 2.1) 
 Demand Curve:  L=b+β*i     (equation 2.2) 
  L∗ =
b−aβ
1+αβ
               (equation 2.3) 
 
Where i indexes nominal interest rate and L indexes loam amount. 
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Figure 2-1 Conceptual Framework 
 
For equation 2.3, I take first partial derivatives for α, a, b and β respectively to get the 
following four equations:   
1)  dL
dα
= -
(b-aβ)
(1+αβ)2 <0
   (equation 2.4, figure 2-(1)) 
2)  dL
da
= -
β
(1+αβ)
<0    (equation 2.5, figure 2-(2)) 
3)  dL
db
=
1
(1+αβ)
>0   (equation 2.6, figure 2-(3)) 
4)  dL
dβ
= -
a
(1+αβ)
-a
(b-aβ)
(1+αβ)
2
  (equation 2.7, figure 2-(4)) 
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Shown in figure(2), figure(2-(1))-(2-(4)) represents four first partial derivatives. Shown in 
figure (2-(1)), shift in “α” to leftwards, means marginal cost of credit increases, then supply 
curve becomes steeper.  For instance, governments take actions (i.e. subsidy, expand deposits) 
to reduce marginal cost of credit.  Shown in figure (2-(2)), shift in “a” to rightwards, leads to 
an increase in supply. For instance, formal financial institutions like ABC and RCC increase 
supply, causing a downward shift in supply curve and reducing the average cost of loans and 
consequently leading to increase demand at a lower interest rate. Shown in figure (2-(3)), shift 
in “b”, means demand curve shifts to rightwards. For instance, famine might increase demands 
of farmers and usury might enter the credit market and increase loans at a higher interest rate. 
Shown in figure (2-(4)), shift in “β”, demand curve becomes more steeper and more inelastic. 
For instance, consumption goods are more elastic than production goods for farmers and 
urgent and special occasions (i.e. Funerals and wedding) have a more inelastic curve.  
Figure (2-(5)) and figure (2-(6)) demonstrate the “demand dominant” and “supply dominant”.  
In our context we define ‘demand dominant’ as an economic outcome in which the statistical 
measure between ‘loan balance’ and interest rates is negative. This would be the usual case 
and arises more from shifts in supply along the demand curve rather than shifts in demand 
along the supply curve. This latter case we refer to as ‘supply dominant’. It is rare and might 
arise when the suppliers of credit have market power against shifts in demand. These demand 
shifts are likely to be with highly inelastic demands for which liquidity is binding. Famine 
would be one example. Other examples would be in the cases of special expenditures such as 
weddings and funerals which have associated cultural attachments In this paper, I find, for 
example, that the relationship between loan outstanding and interest rates is downward sloping 
which indicates what I refer to as a ‘demand dominant’ dynamic (Chapter 4). Furthermore, an 
example of “supply dominant” was found by Turvey and Fu for weddings and funerals (2019; 
see also Fu and Turvey 2018). 
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The ideas presented in this simplified conceptual framework are found throughout this thesis. 
The outstanding loan balances from which I make empirical assessments represent a quasi-
equilibrium, but at any moment in time it is not precisely clear whether loan balances are due 
to supply or demand shifts or changes in elasticity. An observed increase in demand is likely 
due to a multitude of factors of which the net outcome is an increase or decrease, but shifts and 
twists in supply and demand might be occurring simultaneously. One of the tasks of this thesis 
is to separate out these effects. This is presented in Chapters 3 and 4. For the remainder of this 
chapter I provide in greater detail a general discussion of credit supply and demand in China 
during the collective era. 
 
2.3 Credit Supply 
2.3.1 Credit Supply Theory  
Before 1980s, subsidized rural credit theory was seen as one answer to low productivity and 
poverty in the agricultural sectors of developing countries (Avishay Braverman and J. Luis 
Guasch, 1986). According to this theory, agriculture cannot be a financing target for profit-
oriented commercial banks due to the particularity of industry, the uncertainty of income, the 
long-term of investment and low profit of agriculture. In the absence of rational economic 
incentives to promote financial sector development in agriculture it has historically been 
necessary for governments to intervene with low-interest credit in rural areas. However, it is 
then argued that the existence of low interest rates makes specialized agricultural credit 
institutions and formal lenders unable to mobilize rural deposits to build their own sources of 
funding. It is a paradox that in the absence of free-market incentives (i.e. high return, low risk), 
financial development and deepening in rural credit markets has failed to materialize; as a 
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result of this failure, governments intervene with targeted credit policies, which are then used 
as an excuse by formal lenders to not invest in rural areas. 
The theory of rural financial market theory is just the opposite of rural credit subsidy policy. 
According to the theory, firstly, rural residents and even poor farmers have the ability to save, 
and then there is no need to import funds into the rural areas from the outside. Secondly, the 
low interest policies prevent people from saving in formal financial institutions and inhibiting 
financial development. Thirdly, the high dependence of external capitals on the operation of 
financial institutions leads to the decrease of loan recovery rate. Finally, it is reasonable to 
require a high interest rate for informal finance for the rural capitals have more opportunity 
costs.  
Karal Hoff and Joseph E.Stiglitz pointed out the “Imperfect Information” Paradigm in credit 
markets. They mentioned that a dual rural credit market exists in developing countries and the 
financial market in developing countries is not a perfectly competitive market. this is 
particularly true when lenders are unable to fully grasp the (asymmetric) information of 
borrowers including their risk profiles and credit-worthy status. Consequently, rural credit 
demand cannot completely rely on market mechanisms, and it is necessary to adapt appropriate 
government interventions in financial markets to build a complete financial market. The most 
successful government interventions in the formal credit markets are those that draw on the 
ability of the informal sector to solve the selection, monitoring, and enforcement problems of 
lending (Karal Hoff and Joseph E.Stiglitz, 1990). 
2.3.2 Credit supply in China rural market 
Rural Finance sectors in China encountered several financial reforms. Most of scholars focus 
on rural finance reform after 1990 and Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC) is the main provider 
of rural formal finance after 1996. Xie Ping provided an overview of RCC reforms in middle 
1990s and demonstrated that central government should clarify the ownership structure and 
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improve corporate governance of RCCs (Xie Ping 2003). Based on a 1998 survey of financial 
institutions and government officials in southern China, Shen Minggao demonstrated the role 
of financial reforms in the development of China’s rural economy with the rise and fall of joint 
liability lending and rural financial sector has not functioned too badly (Shen Minggao, Huang 
Jikun and Zhang Linxiu,2010). Micro credit companies has been around since 1994. In 
December 2011, the PBC issued guidelines for microfinance at RCC to provide credit services 
for middle and low income level households lacking collateral and guarantees (Turvey and 
Kong, 2010). Kong et al (2007) built a small credit market model in china by the reference of 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. They found out low administrative interest rates of RCC could 
not cover the operation cost and risk of loans . 
2.4 Credit Rationing 
Credit rationing can be divided into two different types, one is the number of rationing, that is, 
the number of loans provided by banks to farmers can not meet the needs of farmers; the other 
is the service rationing, that bank refused to issue loans for farmers to provide credit services. 
Verteramo et al. (2014) pointed out there are three types of rationing: risk rationed, price 
rationed and quantity rationed based on survey of 30 farm households in the Shaanxi province 
of China and from 372 farmers in northeastern Mexico (Verteramo, Khantachavanna & Turvey, 
2014). 
Credit rationing is typical in developing countries and reasons for credit rationing varies. Fixed 
or low interest rate, loan quantity control, and transaction cost might cause credit rationing. 
Based on the All-India Debt and Investment Survey from 1981 to 1982, Kochar conducted 2 
models of sectoral choice. Kochar found out that a fixed and relatively low interest rate policy 
in Indian has resulted in the considerable rationing of formal credit. Lower reservation cost of 
informal credit also reduced the effective formal sector rationing (Anjini Kochar, 1997). 
Verteramo et al. found the incidence of risk rationing in farmers to be 6.5, 14 percent for 
quantity rationed and 80 percent for price rationed in China. It supports the hypothesis that 
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poor farmers in China are more likely to be quantity rationed or level of education in Mexico 
affected quantity rationed. Risk aversion and prudence are significantly correlated with risk 
rationing in China, while only risk aversion is significant in Mexico.  
In China, several scholars conducted researches on credit rationing. Chen Enjiang argues that 
the change in the structure and real rates of interest is one of the most important forces to cause 
the shortage of rural credit (Chen Enjiang, & Zhong Xu, 2004). Based on the survey in 
Western region, Wang Shujuan found out that lack of collaterals excluded farmers from formal 
credit (Wang Shujuan, 2005). Complex procedures and long approval duration also affected 
farmers to obtain loans from formal channels (Chen Liqun, 2011). 
2.5 Credit Demand 
2.5.1 Credit Demand Theory 
Various studies were conducted about features of credit demand and several scholars apply 
Logit and Probit regression models to analyze influencing factors of credit demand (Doung & 
Izumida, 2002).   
2.5.2 Rural Credit Demand Features in China 
The rural lending market in China is fragmented. The coexistence of informal lending markets 
and formal lending markets is a feature of rural credit markets in China. Researches on rural 
credit demand features are mainly focused on the scale, usage and the preference of loans. 
Surveys and researches has shown that informal finance in rural China is extremely common. 
Turvey et al. (2010) found that 53.7% percent of farmers only relied on informal sources and 
24.4% used a combination of formal and informal loans based on a survey of 730 farm 
households (Calum Turvey, Kong Rong, & Huo Xuexi, 2010). He Guangwen (1999) found 
that farmers’ loans from informal lending accounted for more than 75% of total rural 
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household loans. Wen Tiejun conducted a survey of 15 provinces in the Eastern, Middle and 
Western China, he found that the incidence of informal lending was as high as 95% (Wen 
Tiejun, 1999).  The study of IFAD’s 2001 also points out that Chinese farmers’ credit demand 
depends mainly on informal finance, which is about four times the size of loans from formal 
financial institutions. Farmer loans provided by National banks and RCCs accounted for 20% 
to 25% in total farm loans from 1995 to 1999 while informal lending accounted for around 70% 
(Chen Liqun, 2000). Based on the survey of 217 households in Haozhou and Fuyang in Anhui 
province, Zhu found out that the interest-free informal lending accounted for 90% (Zhu 
Shouyin, 2003). It is widely believed that interest rates of informal lending don’t reflect the 
true cost of informal lending for informal lending always occurs between friends and relatives 
which might carry a “Debt of Gratitude”. 
In terms of the usage of loans, the proportion of production loans has exceeded 50% in 1999 
(He Guangwen, 1999). Based on the survey, 45.4% of loans were mainly used to meet 
consumption needs of farmers, 13.4% of the loans were for agricultural production and 32.7% 
were for non-agricultural production (Zhu shouyin, 2003). Han Jun(2007) and He Guangwen 
(2008) pointed out that the usage of farmer loan is not only for production and living purposes, 
but also for emergent events which includes natural disasters, illness, marriage, funeral and etc. 
Those events always happen suddenly and don’t have a certain scale and time tolerance. The 
demand of those abnormal purpose is expanding in recent years. 
In terms of the interest rate of informal lending in China, different scholars hold different 
opinions. Wen Tiejun pointed out that usury (Gaolidai in Chinese) widely exists in rural areas. 
Based on the survey of 41 villages in 24 cities in China, Wen Tiejun calculated that the 
occurrence of informal lending is over 95% and the occurrence rate of usury is over 85% (Wen 
Tiejun 1999). Shi Qinghua pointed out that the low-interest or zero-interest rate is more 
common in rural areas due to lending behaviors happen among close friends and relatives (Shi 
Qinghua, 2002). Results appear to vary based on the selection of samples across China, but the 
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vast majority of research points to zero-interest loans amongst friends and relatives satisfying 
as much as 65% of credit demand, with formal credit making up a small amount of credit, 
about 35%. Usury is quite rare and typically required as a last resort for informal borrowers 
who are known to gamble or drink too much. 
2.4.3 Influencing factors of Credit Demand 
Researches on the influencing factors of credit demand are various and the research framework 
are relatively complete. Research  is generally based on farm surveys of certain areas or region 
during a certain period of time. Influencing factors are more related to the characteristic of 
farmers. By running GLM regression of 1565 farm households in Shanni and Gansu province, 
Turvey and Kong (2010) found out that a strong sense of community trust drove farmers 
simply preferred to informal lending. And the evidence suggests that informal borrowing is not 
a result of spillover effect from credit rationing (Calum Turvey, Kong Rong, 2010). Lu Yajuan 
and Zhang Jingjing applied logistic model to study farmers' borrowing behaviors in Jiangsu 
province. They found that age, level of education, level of income were significantly positively 
correlated with farmers' credit demand (Lu Yajuan and Zhang Jingjing, 2016).  
2.5 Elasticity of Credit Demand  
The high inelasticity of credit demand in developing countries is a conventional wisdom (Bell, 
Srinivasan and Udry 1997).  As a result, interest rate subsidies policies might be ineffective. 
Based on the survey of 897 farmers in Shannxi and Gansu province in 2009, Turvey et al 
(2012) used experimental techniques to extracted individual household credit demand 
functions. It proved the traditional idea that when interest rate falls, demand for credit will 
increase and found that demand elasticity is not everywhere highly inelastic. Nearly 20% of 
farm households have nearly perfect inelastic for credit but also nearly 20% have elasticity 
over -0.75 and 15% even are full of elasticity. Elasticities of credit demand were affected by 
factors like farm profits and risks, demographic and individual features (Turvey and He 
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Guangwen, 2012). Likewise, Bogan et al. (2015) extracted loan demand elasticities of MFI 
(Microfinance institution) in the Dominican Republic by conducting a unique survey. They 
found out that micro entrepreneur have close to unit elastic demand for microcredit (Vicki 
Bogan, Calum Turvey and Gabriela Salazar, 2015).   
Studies of credit demand prior to these are rare, particularly for China. By using OLS and 
3LSL regression, Turvey and Fu (2019; and Fu and Turvey 2018) conducted demand, supply 
and productivity equations on agricultural credit in 1930s China using John Lossing Buck’s 
original survey data (Buck 1937; Hu, Zhong Turvey 2019).  Several interesting results are 
revealed. They found out that more productive farms borrow more and that households with 
special expenditures for weddings and funerals borrow more. The interest rate is positively 
determined by loan amount in both OLS and 3LSL regressions, which implied that farmers are 
interest-rate takers. To conclude, the demand facing farmer is highly inelastic so that a high 
interest rate does not affect the borrowing decision and what interest rate to charge on lenders’ 
side is quantity dependent (Turvey and Hu, 2019). 
2.6 Summary 
In summary, the above studies provide scientific information on rural credits and lay a good 
foundation for further study. However, the study of influencing factors of agriculture credit is 
mainly focused on the demand side, but seldom focused on the supply side like ABC and RCC. 
Few scholars focus on the development of agricultural credit policies before 1990s and few 
focus on the relationship between historical events and agricultural credits. By going back to 
the local financial gazetteers and the historical events from 1950 to 1984, I will analyze 
agricultural credit from a historical view. This investigation begins in the following Chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 AGRICULTURAL CREDIT FROM 1950 TO 1984 
From 1950 to 1984, China encountered initial foundation, development and several transforms. 
The Central government carried out 6 5-Year Plans1 starting from 1953 to 1985 and was aimed 
to transform China from an agricultural country to an industrial country. Over those 34 years, 
China launched the Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution. Following the 
death of Chairman Mao in 1976, Premiere Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms under the Rural 
Household Responsibility System in 1978. The period between 1978 and 1984 is often 
considered a transitional period between the market experiment of allocating land use rights to 
farmers as a first step towards a more market-oriented - rather than government procurement 
based - agricultural economy. Between the years 1950 and 1984 China also witnessed changes 
in rural credit development. In this chapter (as well as Chapter 4) I explore these developments 
illustrate how credit reforms were simultaneously influenced by these historical movements 
and central policies. This chapter provides an overview of credit market developments.  The 
development of credit markets throughout the collective period was, to a large extent, part of 
the centrally planned economy of Chairman Mao. Credit, as will be shown, was used as a 
policy tool over much of the period expanding and contracting depending on whether the focus 
was on industrialization or agricultural development. In Chapter 4 I present provincial and 
city-level econometric results that explore various aspects of this development including the 
effects of the Great Leap Forward, including the push for iron, the Cultural Revolution, floods 
and droughts. 
 
3.1 Introduction of Local Financial Gazetteers (1950-1984) 
As previously discussed, the economics of agriculture (and credit) throughout collectives era 
has been understudied by modern scholars. Part of the reason is that related agricultural data 
published by the Chinese government stops at about 1979 or 1980, and much of the 
                                                 
1 The first 5-Year Plan was conducted in 1953. 
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documentation in the modern era excludes the collective era. The reasoning is straight forward. 
The reforms implemented in 1978 and then 1983/1984 constitute a significant structural break 
in economic thinking and practice. Indeed there have been so many discontinuities in China’s 
pattern of agricultural growth in the past 100 years that to examine it as this would be incorrect. 
In the absence of publicly available data for the 1950-1978/1984 period I relied on the 
contemporaneous accounts of economic and political conditions as reported in the local 
gazetteers. Local financial gazetteers are book-length volumes of local financial history, and 
contain a wealth of information about finance (e.g currency, deposit, credit, exchanges and so 
on), and also record economics policies during different historical movements (e.g the land 
reform, the Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution). Most of the local 
financial gazetteers record abundant information starting from 1949 and some even record 
financial history back to Republican China. The quality and content of gazetteers varies across 
regions, most provide meaningful and valuable resources. As a result, scholars not only in 
China but scholars fond of Chinese history start to use these publications for different research 
projects (Liang Bai, 2014). 
The agricultural loans recorded in these city-level gazetteers are mainly starting from 1950 to 
the end of 1990s. Some not only provide statistics of data, but also devote tens of pages to 
describe the development of formal credit in China which covers ABC, RCCs and other formal 
financial institutions. Generally, the data about informal finance in those gazetteers is rare and 
not continuous but some still provide documentation about the evolution of informal finance. 
In this paper, I collected over 200 city-level financial gazetteers and selected 70 cities with 
relatively complete datasets. Furthermore, I summarize these data by different loan categories 
(e.g Agricultural loans, RCC loans and farmers loans) to study about formal credits. 
For the local gazetteers data, local government devotes resources to write these gazetteers. 
Compared with other historical documentation, local financial gazetteers are detailed and 
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reflecting the history of that time. It is not a summary of past history but accompanying with 
history. Consequently, the data is relatively objective and valuable. 
3.2 Brief Review of Historical Movements from 1950 to 1980 
3.2.1 The Great Leap Forward movement (1958-1961) 
In May 1958, at the Second Session of the 8th National Congress, the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) adopted the general line of “going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, 
faster, better, and more economical results in building Socialism”. The Party initiated the Great 
Leap Forward movement and the People’s commune movement. The Great Leap Forward 
movement revolves around two themes: modernization and urbanization. Modernization 
means transferring China from an agricultural country to an industrial country, while 
urbanization means the expansion of urban population.  During the Great Leap Forward, some 
central leaders realized the mistake and tried to rectify the mistake. 
3.2.1.1 Modernization 
In consistent with the Great Leap Forward movement, the excessive leftist tendency and winds 
of exaggeration were spread in China. As a result, the “Left-leaning” errors marked by “high 
indicators, blind command, wind of exaggeration and communist style” began to proliferate. 
High economic targets were imposed in agriculture, industrial, culture and other aspects. For 
instance, at the National People's Congress in February 1958, congress endorsed a plan to push 
up agricultural, industrial, steel production, and investment growth for the year by 6.1%, 
14.6%, 19.2%, and 17.8%, respectively1. 
Mentioned in Bo’s book2, 30000 furnaces were set up in towns and villages in July 1958. The 
number rocketed from 170000 to 600000 in September. More than 100000 small coal mines 
                                                 
1 See: Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. Hui, & Griffith Glenn(2014), The political and economic history of 
China(1949- 1976) , page 92. Pang and Jin, A Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, 2:783. 
2 See: Bo Yibo, Memories of Important Decisions and events, 2:322, CPC Party History Publishing House. 
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were built. There were 1.22 million small-scale factories that relied on the manual labors of 
24.89 million workers in 1958, mostly farmers; and 75000 machine-run factories employing 
8.4 million workers. Together, they made up a total of 1.29 million industrial businesses with 
33.3 million employees. Rural labor forces in the industrial sector once ran as high as over 60 
million employees1. 
Meanwhile, the grain output, pig iron output and the steel output all reached a peak during the 
Great Leap Forward movement. Shown in figure 3-1 and figure 3-2, the grain output reached a 
peak around 1958 and then collapsed after 1958. The pig iron and steel reached a peak in 1960 
and then collapsed and regrew to a second peak in 1966. Along with the pig iron and steel 
production reached the peak, the urban population also expanded simultaneously.  
 
Figure 3-1 Total Pig Iron Output in China from 1949-1980 
                                                 
1 See: Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. Hui, & Griffith Glenn (2014), The political and economic history of 
China(1949- 1976) , Chapter 8, page 94. 
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Figure 3-2 Total Grain Output in China from 1949-1980 
The industrial output value transcended agriculture output in 1956 and reached a first peak 
during the Great Leap Forward movement (Shown in figure 3-3). In 1960, the proportion ratio 
of agriculture to industry was only 27.92%, which means the agriculture output value was less 
than one third of industrial output value. Starting from 1961, agricultural output maintained a 
slow growth trend during the Cultural Revolution, while industrial output rocketed in 1960s 
and reached a second peak in 1966, it firstly collapsed from 1966 to 1968 but rebounded to 
grow during the Cultural Revolution. The gap between agricultural output value and industrial 
output value had been widen. The annual growth rate of agriculture output during the Great 
Leap Forward movement was only -0.4%, while the growth of industry output value was -
0.7%, which was mainly due to the big drop in 1961. The annual growth rate of agriculture 
during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution was 3.3% and rate of the late stage of the 
Cultural Revolution was 4.0%, which showed a slight rebound sign for Central government 
started to realize the mistake of the Cultural Revolution.  
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Figure 3-3 Agricultural and Industry Output Value from 1949 to 1980 
 
Figure 3-4 Total Steel Output In China from 1949 to 1980 
3.2.1.2 Urbanization 
In terms of urbanization, labor forces grew by 67.5% from 1957 to 1958. State-owned 
enterprises employed 20 million more people, 84.9% higher than a year earlier1. Employees 
increased by another 2 million in 1959. Simultaneously, the urban population expanded by 
7.72 million in 1958 and by 31.24 million in 1960. But the expansion of urban population was 
                                                 
1 See: National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 1991, 95. Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. 
Hui, & Griffith Glenn(2014), The Political and Economic History of China(1949- 1976) , Chapter 8, page 96. 
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pushed by Industrialization Movement and Central government policy. Mentioned in Hu’s 
book1, after People’s communes campaign was launched, rural labors migration to cities had 
been forbidden. The ban of the free flow of rural labors ruined rural labors motivation and the 
transfer of labors under the Industrialization Movement for steel and pig iron production made 
farmers away from the agricultural production and strengthen the famine in rural areas. 
To sum up, the process of modernization and urbanization during this period was at the 
sacrifice of agriculture and agricultural credit development. Firstly, the labor resource 
mobilization from rural areas to urban areas made several cadres be away from their positions. 
According to Gansu financial gazetteers 2 , in 1962, the number of employees in RCCs 
decreased from 4,627 to 2,526 with a decrease of 45.4%. On average, only 1.17 cadres were on 
duty in each RCC. Secondly, People’s communes emphasized egalitarianism and carried out 
Daguofan3 (Big bowl) in communal dining, resulting in ruining farmers’ incentives to produce.  
3.2.2 Three-year Economic Hardship from 1959 to 1961 
As a result of the Great Leap Forward movement and nationwide natural disasters, China 
encountered three-year economic hardship from 1959 to 1961. Grain output declined from 
nearly 170 million tons in 1959 to 137 million tons in 1961 and famine was spread in China, 
especially in rural areas.  
3.2.2.1 Natural Disaster in China 
The main types of natural disasters in China are drought and flood. To clarify, “areas covered” 
means around 10% of the total sown areas were covered by natural disasters and “areas 
affected” means around 30% of the total sown areas were affected by natural disasters. In this 
paper, I use “areas affected” to better describe the serious extent of natural disasters. 
                                                 
1 Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. Hui, & Griffith Glenn(2014), The Political and Economic History of 
China(1949- 1976), Chapter 8, page 1. 
2 Recorded in Gansu financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 395. 
3 Daguofan refers to the system of paying workers in state-owned factories a fixed salary regardless of ability or 
ambition. 
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Figure 3-5 Drought in China from 1950 to 1988 
According to the data from Ministry of Water Conservancy, there were three peak periods of 
drought happening in PRC from 1949 to 19881. The first peak was from 1958 to 1962 with 30 
million mu of sown area were affected by drought in each year. Year 1959, 1960 and 1961 are 
those years when drought covered area were over 40 million mu. Shown in figure 3-5, the 
drought affected areas was closely related with the drought covered areas and showed 
contemporaneous trend. Starting from 1959, the Middle agricultural zones and lower reaches 
of the Yellow river and Yangtze river suffered from low precipitation. Henan. Shandong, 
Anhui, middle parts of Jiangsu, Hubei, northern parts of Hunan, middle and southern parts of 
Shannxi, eastern part of Sichuan and northern part of Shanxi province encountered drought in 
the summer of 1959. Over 10 million tons of grain were reduced due to the drought and more 
than 47 million people suffered from the drought. 
The drought affected areas continued to expand in 1960 and Hebei, Henan, Shandong and 
Shanxi these four provinces were seriously affected by drought. Drought covered areas in 
these four provinces reached 270 million mu, which accounted for 47% of the nationwide 
drought covered areas and affected 60% of the total sown areas in these four provinces. The 
                                                 
1 According the Ministry of Water Conservancy, the three peak periods of drought are 1959 to 1962, 1972 and 1978 
to 1982. 
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drought affected areas reached the first peak in 1961, 243 million mu was affected by drought. 
According to the report from Ministry of water conservancy, droughts in 1961 were mainly 
located in large parts of northern part of China and Yangtze river and Huai river. Over 1367 
million tons of grain was reduced due to the drought and more than 64 million people suffered 
from the drought.  
In terms of flood, flood was not as serious as drought from 1959 to 1961. Even though the 
flood affected ratio was larger than drought affected ratio but the absolute affected areas were 
much smaller than drought affected areas. The flood affected areas were 27.3, 74.6 and 80.3 
million mu respectively. Guangdong, Hebei and Shandong province had the largest flood 
affected areas from 1959 to 1961.  According to the record in Ministry of Water Conservancy1, 
the largest flood since 1939 occurred in the lower reaches of the Songhua River in 1960, more 
than 570,000 people and 930 square kilometers in Jiamusi city were affected. 
 
Figure 3-6 Flood in China from 1950 to 1988 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Forty years of water conservancy construction achievements- Statistics of water conservancy 
published by the Department of Planning in Ministry of Water Conservancy in 1989, page 315. 
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3.2.2.2 The Great Famine 
Both urban and rural consumption of grain per capita reached a peak in 1957, and hit the 
bottom in 1961. The famine started in 1959 and started to spread across Hebei, Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi province, leaving tremendous devastation particularly in Hebei and 
Shandong province. Mentioned by Justin Lin, priority for food supplies was given to cities 
with populations representing at least 10% of the total national data. The rural population, 
especially those living in extreme poverty, suffered much more from causality during the Great 
Famine (Kai-sing Kung & Justin Lin, 2003).  To make situations worse, in that year, there was 
a net export of grain of 4.16 million tons from China1. In 1960, the net export volume was 
recorded at 2.65 million tons2. Suffering from the Great Leap Forward, natural disasters and 
the Great Famine, the total number of population decreased by 15 million according to the data 
from Ministry of Water Conservancy. 
3.2.3 Trials to rectify the mistake  
During the Great Leap Forward movement, central leaders like Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and 
General Peng Dehuai tried to rectify the mistakes, but were neglected. And Chairman Mao 
Zedong started to realize his mistake. In May 1959, Mao Zedong proposed at the Politburo 
meeting to reduce China's steel production target for 1959 to 13 million tons, and steel product 
target from 11.5 million to 9 million tons3. The idea was received the support from Liu Shaoqi, 
Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping 4 . This reflected that central leaders started to realize to 
undertake adjustments to the Great Leap Forward movement. But mistakes were not fully 
                                                 
1 See: Planning Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 1949-1983, 443. & Justin Y. Lin, 
Fang Cai and Zhouli, China’s Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform (Beijing: Beijing University 
Press,2000), 290. 
2 See: Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. Hui, & Griffith Glenn (2014), The Political and Economic History of 
China (1949- 1976), Chapter 8, page 97. 
3 See: Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. Hui, & Griffith Glenn (2014), The Political and Economic History of 
China (1949- 1976), Chapter 8, page 101. 
4 See: He Peng, China during Mao Zedong’s Era:1949-1976, Chapter2, page123. 
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realized. The 8th Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee was held in August 
1959, during this conference General Peng Dehuai and other cadres were seriously criticized 
and condemned as “anti-party clique”. The anti-rightist campaign was spread in China until 
spring of 1960. 
From January to February 1962, the Central government held the Seven-Thousand Cadres 
Conference and 7,188 cadres from the Central, provincial, municipal and county governments 
attended this conference. Chairman Mao Zedong admitted his mistakes at this conference but 
he simply attributed the problems to inner party conflicts. Mentioned in Hu’s book1, Deng 
Xiaoping realized that the Seven-Thousand Cadres Conference had sowed the political seeds 
into the Cultural Revolution. 
3.2.4 Rural Household Responsibility System 
Mentioned in Hu’s book2, the Rural Household Responsibility system (RHS) appeared after 
the Lushan conference in 1959. The idea of contracting production quotas to each household 
was first suggested by Minister of Agriculture Deng Zihui at a working conference of the 
Central Committee in May3. Later, Chen Yun suggested a de-collectivized system (fen tian dao 
hu4 in Chinese) of contracting with individual households in June. At that time, about 20% of 
the communes across the country were practicing the Rural Household Responsibility system. 
In Anhui province, as many as 80% of the households were contracted. In the poorest Guizhou 
province, 40% of the households were contracted5 (Hu Angang, 2014).  
                                                 
1 See: Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. Hui, & Griffith Glenn(2014), The Political and Economic History of 
China(1949- 1976), Chapter 8, page 146-147. 
2 See: Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. Hui, & Griffith Glenn(2014), The Political and Economic History of 
China(1949- 1976), Chapter 8, page 158. 
3 See: Pang Xianzhi. “Mao Zedong and His Secretary Tian jiaying,” in Dong Bian, Tan Deshan, and Zeng Zi, eds., 
Mao Zedong and His Secretary Tian Jiaying (Beijing: China Archival Press, 1996), 90. 
4 Fen tian dao hu refers to land is allocated to each household for cultivation, and each household is responsible for 
a part of the land. 
5 See: Angang Hu, Guangyu, Hu, Vivian C.W. Hui, & Griffith Glenn(2014), The Political and Economic History of 
China(1949- 1976), Chapter 8, page 161. 
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Mao was the only one against the rural household-based contract farming systems, denouncing 
the Rural Household Responsibility system as a form of Capitalism in nature, and the 
decollectivized system as a threat to rural collectivism. At the Tenth Plenary Session of the 8th 
CPC Central Committee in September, Mao Zedong criticized Deng Zihui and later on Deng 
Zihui was dismissed from Vice-Premier of the State Council. However, no one could go 
against Chairman Mao Zedong at that time, consequently, the Rural Household Responsibility 
system was shut down all across China; this critical agricultural reform was thus strangled. 
3.2.5 The Cultural Revolution 
The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” was a complex social upheaval that began as a 
struggle between Mao Zedong and other senior party leaders for influence within the Chinese 
Communist Party of China (CPC) and went on to affect all of China with its call for continuing 
revolution (Spence, 1990). It lasted for 10 years and reshaped Central government policies in 
China. 
One of the main features during the Cultural Revolution is the loss of human capital. 
Teenagers in China were called to become the next generation of revolutionaries-“Red Guard”. 
Red Guards didn’t attend classes but were keen on class struggle. Many cultural treasure and 
intellectual scholars were attacked under this movement. Furthermore, a large-scale rural 
rustification program was initiated in part to discharge the Red Guards (Bernstein, 1977). Mao 
pointed out that youth should be re-educated by farmers in rural areas. From 1967 until 1978, 
an estimated 17 million urban youths were sent down to rural areas (Liang Bai, 2014). 
During the Cultural Revolution, China put forward the third and the fourth Five-Year Plans. 
The third Five-Year Plan was essentially a preparation plan centered on national defense and 
the Third-Line construction 1 . The fourth Five-Year plan took class conflict as guiding 
                                                 
1 The third-line construction refers to the large-scale development of national defense, science and technology, 
industry and transportation infrastructure in 13 provinces and autonomous regions in Middle and Western China 
since 1964 as a preparation for war. 
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principles. Furthermore, there were two main activities in rural China. The first one is focus on 
agricultural mechanization and another is to learn from Dazhai1 mode. 
3.3 The history of rural formal finance system before 1978 
Summarize the changes in agricultural credit from 1950 to 1978, the first change occurred in 
credit institutions. After four times of establishments and withdrawals of the Agricultural Bank 
of China (ABC), ABC became the main supplier for rural finance in China. RCC experienced 
initial establishment in 1950s and rapid development before 1958 and encountered huge 
change during the Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution.  
3.3.1 ABC History 
3.3.1.1 The initial development of rural credit system (1950-1957) 
During this period, ABC experienced twice establishments and cancellation. The first Five-
Year Plan2 was successfully carried out and both industrial and agricultural production targets 
had been exceeded. In June 1951, the Agricultural Cooperative Bank was formally established3. 
Three months after its establishment, the Agricultural Cooperative Bank started to formulate 
loan scheme and to set interest rates for agricultural loans by category. Due to the initial 
establishment, agricultural loans increased by 200% in 1952 compared with 1951 (Shown in 
Table 3-1). 
 
 
                                                 
1 Dazhai is a brigade of Dazhai Commune in Xiyang County, Shanxi Province. It was originally a poor small village. 
After the agricultural cooperatives movement, commune members cut into mountains and built terraces, which 
increased the grain output per mu by seven times. 
2 The first Five-Year Plan was issued in 1952, proposing to establish a preliminary foundation for China's socialist 
industrialization. 
3 Relevant document: "Report on the Preparation of Agricultural Cooperative Bank to China Finance Committee”, 
the People's Bank of China,1951. 
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Table 3-1Agricultural Loan from 1950 to 1952 
Year  Loans Issued 
Growth 
Rate(%) 
 Loans Paid back 
Pay Back 
ratio(%) 
1950 2.0868  1.3218 63.30  
1951 3.5489 70.06  2.2681 68.91  
1952 10.7550 203.05  8.0292 79.60  
Source: The history of ABC, Economic Science Press, 2000. 
note: The unit of loans is 100 Million Yuan. 
In July 1952, the head office of the People's Bank of China abolished the Agricultural 
Cooperative Bank. In March 1955, ABC was formally established and approved by the State 
Council. During the second establishment, ABC started to issue loans for extremely poor 
households, irrigation and water conservancy and to build up poverty cooperative fund. 
3.3.1.2 Tortuous development of ABC from 1958 to 1976 
In October 1963, the State Council decided to establish ABC for the third time. However, due 
to the duplication of work and numerous procedures in the grass-roots institutions of ABC and 
the People's Bank of China, there were also contradictions between the two banks. Considering 
the above situation, in November 1965, the State Council decided to merge ABC into the 
People's Bank of China again. 
The turmoil of the Cultural Revolution has also had a great impact on agricultural credit work. 
Rural credit operation emphasizes that "taking class struggle as the key point" to support 
Dazhai1 mode in rural areas and agricultural mechanization. In October 1975, the Central 
Committee of China convened the National Agricultural Conference to call for learning from 
Dazhai mode and required more than one third of the counties to build into Dazhai mode and 
realize agricultural mechanization by 1980. As a result, loan management became loose and 
equipment loans for agricultural production increased at an extraordinary rate. 
                                                 
1 Dazhai is a brigade of Dazhai Commune in Xiyang County, Shanxi Province. It was originally a poor small village. 
After the agricultural cooperatives movement, commune members cut into mountains and built terraces, which 
increased the grain output per mu by seven times. 
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3.3.1.3 Reform and development from 1976 
In December 1978, the CPC Central Committee convened 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee, which opened the prelude of reform and open policy. The Rural 
Household Responsibility system was established after that and gradually spread in China. In 
April 1979, the central working conference decided to implement the policy of “adjustment, 
reform, reorganization and improvement”. Since 1979, the rural economic system had 
undergone tremendous changes, and the management system based on household contract 
management had been established. The main body of rural economy has changed from a single 
production team to a contractor-based, a professional household and various economic 
associations. The focus of agricultural loan changed from agriculture collectives to individual 
farmers, changed from small-scale for poor farmer to bigger-scale for production. 
3.3.2 RCC history 
After the land reform1 in 1950, helping farmers to organize rural production was put forward at 
the financial conference held by the head office of the People's Bank of China. On December 
16th 1953, the CPC Central Committee made the Resolution on the Development of 
Agricultural Production Cooperatives, which promoted the development of RCCs. By the end 
of 1955, 159,363 RCCs2 had been set up with 320,000 employees and 205 million yuan in 
stock capital. RCC had become an important supplier of rural finance.  
It is worth noting that from 1955 to 1956, agricultural cooperatives movement reached its 
climax under the wind of criticizing “right-wing” conservative ideas. Primary agricultural 
cooperatives were generally established in 1955, and advanced agricultural cooperation were 
organized in a short period of time. According to Sichuan financial gazetteers3, there were 
173,000 primary agricultural cooperatives and 633 advanced cooperatives in 1955. But within 
                                                 
1 According to the Land Reform Law of the People's Republic of China, there were about 300 million landless and 
landless farmers in the country who shared the land. 
2 See: Book: The History of ABC, Economic Science Press,2000. 
3 Recorded in Sichuan Financial gazetteer, Chapter 4, page 90. 
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a year, 126,000 advanced cooperatives were established and remained 60,000 primary 
cooperatives. The rapid transformation of cooperatives has forced banks to increase their 
agricultural loans rapidly. The balance of agricultural loans in 1956 increased by 202% in 1955. 
The focus of rural financial work had also been shifted to support agricultural cooperatives and 
expand the scale of infrastructure construction.  
Under this transformation, many cadres and farmers took bank loans as free financial support 
and competed for loan indicators regardless of whether loans were really needed or not and 
whether they have the ability to repay. In 1956, the People's Bank of China announced an 
increase of 1.12 billion yuan1 in agricultural loans at the beginning of the year, but actual 
annual increase was 2.02 billion yuan. In addition, loans from RCCs increased by 680 million 
yuan in 1956, consequently it imposed an important effect on credit imbalance. 
Table 3-2 Changes in National Agricultural Loans from 1953 to 1957 
Year 
Year-end 
balance (100 
million yuan) 
Increase over the 
previous year 
Increase or 
Decrease (%) 
% of total 
Bank loans 
1953 6.6  2.4  57.0  4.9  
1954 7.6  1.0  15.2  4.1  
1955 10.0  2.4   31.6 4.9  
1956 30.2  20.2  202.0  13.0  
1957 27.7  -2.5  -8.3  10.0  
Source: Forty Years of Endeavour compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics and published by 
China Statistics Press. 
During the Great Leap Forward movement, rural financial institutions including RCCs were 
decentralized to People’s communes. The State Council issued On Several Issues in the Work 
of the Credit Department of People's Communes and on the Liquidity of State-owned 
Enterprises in 1958. Following this document, rural offices of the People's Bank of China were 
merged with RCCs to form the credit division of the People's commune. RCCs were 
                                                 
1 See: Book: The History of ABC, Economic Science Press, 2000. 
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transferred to the People's commune and production brigade for management. Consequently, 
RCCs had become a financial tool of the basic commune teams. 
During the Great Leap Forward movement, there were several problems occurring in RCCs. 
Firstly, there were too many loans issued by commune teams and could not be collected back. 
RCCs did not have sufficient funds to guarantee the payment of deposits, nor to issue loans. 
Secondly, a lot of cadres from rural areas were transferred to urban areas for steel production. 
As a result, the absent of RCC cadres also affected the daily operation of RCCs. RCCs were 
not restored until the People’s Bank of China decided to retrieve its power in March 1963. 
From January to February 1962, Central government held a “seven-thousand cadres 
conference” and the State Council approved the Regulations on Several Issues of Rural Credit 
Cooperatives made by the People’s Bank of China, which clearly pointed out that RCCs were 
the mutual-aid organizations of farmers and should operate independently, account 
independently and be responsible for their own profits and losses, and should be under the 
leadership of the People's Bank of China.  
In 1969, the People’s communes and Production Brigade established the "Management 
Committee for the poor, the lower and the middle income level farmers". The human rights 
and financial rights of RCCs were all handed over to the management committee. 
3.3.3 Interest Rate of Rural Formal Finance from 1950 to 1984 
Interest rates of rural formal finance is exogenous and set by Central government, which is 
closely related with policies. Interest rate of agricultural loans and farmer loans had gone 
through a trend from high to low and then from low to high.  From 1950 to 1952, production 
interest rate was dropped by the guidance of Central government. In terms of interest rate of 
RCCs, during the three years of national economic recovery after the founding of the PRC, 
RCCs had not been generally established. During this period, national banks allowed them to 
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determine their own interest rates. Take Yunnan province as an example, the interest rate of 
RCCs was referred to informal lending of local rural credit market. The monthly interest rate 
was 16 ‰ in 30 counties which was 6% points higher than national banks. 
From 1953 to 1957, the types of interest rates were simplified and interest rates kept to be 
lowered due to the dominant position of state-owned economy. During the second Five-Year 
Plan and the national economic adjustment period (1958-1965), the interest rate was affected 
by the wind of left-leaning. In order to expand the grain output and solve the slow turnover of 
agriculture fund, the People’s Bank of China submitted the Report on Reducing Agricultural 
Loan Interest Rate to the Fiscal Finance and Trade Office of the State Council. The Report 
stated that the monthly interest rate of agricultural loans would be reduced by 4.8% from 6%. 
Secondly, Central government continued to provide low interest rates and even interest-free 
loans for agricultural collectives. The monthly interest rate of equipment loans for collective 
production was reduced from 6‰ to 4.8‰ in 1961 and kept to be lowered to 2.16‰ in 1965.  
 
Figure 3-7 Annual Interest Rate of Agricultural Loans from 1950 to 1984 
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During the period of the Cultural Revolution, the interest rate of agricultural loans was greatly 
reduced. In October 1971, the monthly interest rate fell to 3.6‰. Furthermore, as shown in the 
figure 3-7, interests rate of farmer loans were higher than agricultural production loans. At the 
Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of China, Central government 
started to increase interest rates. Monthly interest rate of agriculture loans was raised to 6‰ in 
1981 and to 6.6‰ in 1983. RCCs were allowed to float interest rate on bench interest rate of 
national banks in the middle of 1980s. 
3.4 Agricultural Loan and Farmer Loan from 1950 to 1984 
3.4.1 Agricultural Loans from 1950 to 1984 
In 1950, national banks started to issue in-kind loans during the rural land reform period. 
According to the records of Gansu rural financial gazetteers1, the total grain issued reached 
more than 360,000 shidan (75kg per dan) in 1950, and expanded to more than 434,000 shidan 
in the first half of 1951, which played a positive role in helping farmers resume production and 
fighting against disasters and famine. At the same time, Guangxi province began to issue 
agricultural loans to individual farmers. At the beginning of 1950, Central South Branch of the 
People’s Bank of China allocated 2.1 million kilograms of rice (including 1.53 million 
kilograms of rice in kind) as agricultural loans to Guangxi province, in the hope of helping 
resume agricultural production and supporting rural production in Guangxi 2 . In kind 
agricultural loans were mainly rice and needed to be repaid in kind. In April 1950, 1.16 million 
kilograms of agricultural loans were issued to poor farmers, mainly for building up small 
water-conservancy projects, supplementing farm tools and buying seeds and fertilizers. By the 
end of 1953, 19.95 million yuan of agricultural loans have been granted in Guangxi province, 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Gansu rural financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 385. 
2 Recorded in Guangxi financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 417. 
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including 17.37 million yuan in cash, 7.52 million kilograms of in kind loans and 70,000 dan 
of fertilizers. 
During the Great Leap Forward movement, rural areas launched “Four Constructions 1 ” 
campaign and “Three rural plants2” campaign. RCCs issued as many loans as possible and 
tried to meet the demand of farmers in that period of time. 
In 1962, Central government put forward the Eight-Character3 Adjustment Policy. As it can be 
seen from Table A-1, the total loans declined from 1961 to 1962, but agricultural loans 
increased due to the adjustment policy. But agriculture loans kept stagnated and even became 
negative during the Cultural Revolution. The scale of agricultural loans grew by 120 million 
yuan per year in ten years, with negative growth rates in three years, 1966, 1968 and 1971 
respectively.  
3.4.2 RCC loans and Farmer loans from 1950 to 1984 
Farmer loans change along with rural economic system and form of production organization. 
From 1950 to 1957, it was called farmer loans and later it was called commune loans from 
1958 to 1980. After 1981, it was called leaseholding farmer loans. 
Shown in figure 3-8, RCC loans grew relatively slower compared with RCC deposits from 
1953 to 1979. The gap between RCC deposits and RCC loans kept to increase after 1962. RCC 
loans reached a peak during the Great Leap Forward movement and kept stagnated until 1979.  
Furthermore, it can be found out that the deposit to loan ratio of RCC declined from 1956 to 
1957 and then began to rise during the Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural 
Revolution. Deposit to loan ratio reached a peak in 1974 and then began to decline until 1978. 
                                                 
1 Four constructions campaign refers to car construction, commune dining construction, hogs farms construction 
and steel construction. 
2 Three rural plants refers to fertilizer plants, farm tools plants and pesticide plants. 
3 Eight Character policy refers to Adjustment, consolidation, enrichment and improvement. 
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After 1979, the deposit to loan ratio of credit cooperatives declined rapidly and recovered to 
around 2 in 1984. 
 
Figure 3-8 Statistics of Deposit and Loan from RCC from 1953 to 1984 
 
 
Figure 3-9 Deposit to Loan Ratio of RCC from 1953 to 1984 
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In terms of farmer loans, farmer loans were mainly issued by RCCs but farmer loans decreased 
during the Great Leap Forward movement because the credit division of the People’s 
communes stopped issuing loans to commune members. On the other hand, collective 
agricultural loans developed quickly in this period. Farmer loans decreased year by year from 
1971 to 1975 which was mainly due to the stagnation of rural credit development during the 
Cultural Revolution. After 1979, farmer loans started to increase rapidly as the Rural 
Household Responsibility system made farmer loans a new focus of bank loans. The annual 
grow rate of farmer loans from 1979 to 1988 was 48% (Shown in Table A-2). In summary, 
both RCC loans and farmer loans showed decline during the Great Leap Forward movement. 
The boost of agricultural loans and decline of farmer loans during the Great Leap Forward 
movement might reflect that farmers didn’t benefit from the increase of agricultural loans and 
some other institutions occupied the resource. This might be explained by Redlining1 and rural 
formal financial institutions kept withdrawing money from farmers and invested in urban areas 
and industrial field. 
 
                                                 
1 Redlining is an unethical practice that puts services (financial and otherwise) out of reach for residents of certain 
areas based on race or ethnicity. It can be seen in the systematic denial of mortgages, insurance, loans and other 
financial services based on location rather than an individual's qualifications and creditworthiness.  
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3.5 Informal Lending in rural China from 1950 to 1978 
In this part, I try to analyze the features of informal lending based on the documentation of 
financial gazetteers. 
At the first National Finance Conference1 after the PRC was founded, it was pointed out that 
informal lending should be encouraged in both old and new liberated rural areas. In December 
1950, at the Second National Finance Conference, it was pointed out that informal lending was 
better than nonexistence of lending channels2, although the interest rate was higher in informal 
market.  
Besides, usury was quite rampant and typical in rural areas. According to a survey of 4,175 
farmers in Dingxi, Yuzhong, Gaolan, Gangu, Tongwei, Huixian and Minle counties in Gansu 
province, more than 2,600 farmers bore high-interest debts. The monthly interest rate was 
usually 1% to 3% and some was as high as 10%3. 
In July 1953, the State Council affirmed the rightful status of rural informal lending by 
releasing report “Instructions on Issuing Agricultural Loans”. The State Council pointed out 
that “At present, national banks cannot fully meet the credit needs of farmers and RCCs were 
not generally developed, rural informal lending is still needed by farmers and should be 
allowed to exist and develop4.". 
According to the statistics in Zhenwu village of Santai county from 1950 to 1952 and in 
Minzhu village and Huopen village of Jianyang county in 1953, there were 375 lending cases 
among farmers, with 7.314 million yuan, 28 silver dollars, 102 kilograms of cotton, 22 feet of 
nankeen, 30 kilograms of hand yarn, 252 taels of raw silk, 2 dou5 of peanut seeds, 848 dou of 
grains and 3,634 kilograms of sweet potatoes. It played an important role in solving the 
                                                 
1 National Finance Conference was convened and organized by the PBC in March 1950. 
2 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 10,page 231. 
3 Recorded in Gansu financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 385. 
4 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 10, page 231. 
5 Dou is a unit of measurement in China. 1 Dou is equal to 12.5 kilograms. 
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production and living difficulties of poor farmers at that time. For example, during the spring 
ploughing period, 27 farmers had difficulties in their daily life in Huopen village and 20 
households solved the problem through borrowing from friends and relatives1. 
Survey conducted in Northern Sichuan rural areas in 1952 recorded several changes of rural 
informal lending in Suining, Santai, Shehong, Guangyuan and Daxian counties compared with 
informal lending before the liberation of the PRC. Firstly, since the reduction of rent and 
withdrawal of mortgage in autumn 1950, the economy situation of farmers has improved. As a 
result, the majority of lenders have changed from landlords or rich farmers to normal farmers. 
Secondly, in-kind lending was still the majority form and cash lending cases were few, and 
each lending amount was small. Thirdly, almost all loans were interest-free. According to the 
survey of Dayu county2, 98% of the loans bore no interest rate and only 2% bore interest rate. 
Fourthly, all loans had very short maturities, usually took three or six days to pay back. Fifthly, 
loans were used for in-kind agricultural tax (Gong Liang3 in Chinese), food, seed fertilizers 
and business. Among them, loans were used for self-consumption accounted for the largest 
proportion. For instance, it was 68% for consumption, 15% for in-kind agricultural tax, 8% for 
seed fertilizers purchase, and 9% for business and others in 1950. While in 1951, it was 57% 
for consumption, 10% for grain consumption and seed fertilizer purchase, and 33% for 
business and others4. 
By the end of 1955, national banks and RCCs became the main supplier of rural credit, and 
then informal lending dropped to a subordinate position. To sum up, informal lending played 
an important role in restoring and developing the rural economy from 1950 to 1957. 
From 1958 to 1962, rural economy suffered serious setbacks and national banks and RCCs 
were seriously affected due to the influence of “blind command, exaggeration and 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 10, page 232. 
2 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 10, page 233. 
3 After the founding of the PRC, in order to release the burden farmers, agricultural taxes were still levied in kind. 
Gong Liang is another term for agricultural tax. 
4 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 10, page 233. 
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Communism” during the Great Leap Forward movement. According to the statistics of Ya’an, 
Fuling, Neijiang and Wanxian city at the end of December 19621, 10% of RCCs were unable 
to issue loans, 31% were unable to pay back deposits of farmers, and later closed frequently. 
As the main channel of rural credit was severely weakened, poor farmers had difficulty in 
borrowing money. Consequently, market demand exceeded supply, interest rates of rural 
informal lending had generally risen. During the three-year economic hardship, usury began to 
develop again. There were two main types of usury in the market: in-kind usury and cash usury. 
According to the survey of 78 production teams in three counties of Daxian, Deyang and Dayi 
in 1963, there were 32 households issued usury which accounted for 7.2% of total households, 
and the size decreased to 13 households in 1964 which accounted for 2.9% of total household. 
On February 25 in 1964, the Central Committee approved “Report on Usury Activities in 
Urban and Rural Areas and Measures to Ban Usury” conducted by Deng Zihui, it requested 
all localities to resolutely crack down and ban usury activities 2 . However, against usury 
activities in rural areas were later regarded as "class enemies”, consequently, it made usury 
activities covert to underground, but also made normal informal lending difficult to develop. 
In May 1981, the head office of ABC handed in “The Report About Rural Lending” to the 
State Council, which pointed out “When dealing with the credit relationship in the countryside, 
under the condition that national banks and RCCs are dominant, it is beneficial to allow the 
existence of legitimate loans between the collective and members, and between members and 
members, as a supplement to ABC and RCC.”3. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 10, page 234. 
2 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 10, page 234. 
3 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 10, page 236. 
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CHAPTER 4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
4.1 Analysis of Provincial Agricultural Loan from 1950 to 1984 
In Chapter 3 I provided an overview of credit conditions during the 1950-1979/1984 period. I 
identified several key factors that affected the agricultural loan balances (demand and supply) 
including the Great Leap Forward movement, the Cultural Revolution, various floods and 
droughts, and credit reforms with the multiple establishments of the Agricultural Bank of 
China and Rural Credit Cooperatives. In this chapter I econometrically investigate the 
relationships between these exogenous policy effects on agricultural credit. My base measure 
is the amount of agricultural debt outstanding which is the quasi-equilibrium balance of 
demand and supply. 
4.1.1 Data Resources 
I collected data of 16 provinces from A compilation of 60 year statistics in China and from 
local financial gazetteers which provide continuous and complete agricultural loans data from 
1950 to 1984. Data of Hubei and Anhui province come from local financial gazetteers while 
data of Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, Shandong, Shanxi, 
Shannxi, Zhejiang, Guizhou, Henan, Jilin and Jiangxi province come from A compilation of 60 
year statistics in China published by National Bureau of Statistics in 2010. Among 16 
provinces, 4 provinces belong to the Middle region, 6 provinces belong to the Eastern region 
and 6 provinces belong to the Western region. In the regression, I take the natural logarithms 
of nominal agricultural loans as dependent variable.  
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Table 4-1 Annual growth rate of Agricultural Loans in 16 provinces from 1950 to 1984 
Province 1951-1952 1955-1956 
1958-
1961 
1966-1971 1972-1976 
Hubei 140% 122% 11% 2% 18% 
Guangxi 1572% 59% 1% -2% 23% 
Heilongjian
g 
 292% 21% -15% 16% 
Liaoning 144% 143% 20% -2% 8% 
Sichuan 118% 155% 26% -9% 20% 
Anhui 346% 161% 14% -11% 6% 
Yunnan 230% 142% -2% -4% 15% 
Gansu 90% 132% 8% -10% 35% 
Shandong  188% 11% -9% 14% 
Shanxi 172% 203% -4% -11% 17% 
Shannxi 61% 147% -16% 2% 21% 
Zhejiang 408% 116% 24% 8% 10% 
Guizhou 120% 190% 25% -3% 7% 
Henan 54% 244% 26% -14% 12% 
Jilin 199% 290% 25% -2% 8% 
Jiangxi -17% 238% 8% -7% 12% 
Mean 260% 176% 13% -5% 15% 
Min -17% 59% -16% -15% 6% 
Max 1572% 292% 26% 8% 35% 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Agricultural Loans of 16 Provinces from 1950 to 1984 
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In order to study the influencing factors of formal credit, Firstly, I sorted out the grain output 
for 16 provinces. The unit for grain output is 10 thousand tons. The data of grain output comes 
from the book A compilation of 60 year statistics in China. Secondly, natural disasters play an 
important factor on formal credit supply. Drought and Flood are two main disasters which 
significantly affect crop production in China. According to local gazetteers, Central 
government always expanded credit supply to reduce potential losses from natural disasters. 
For instance, serious floods occurred in some counties of Liaoxi Province1 in September 1952. 
The branch of Liaoxi Province decided to issue loans for vegetable seeds in the disaster area to 
solve the financial difficulties of purchasing vegetable seeds for farmers. Another example is 
recorded in Guangxi province2, Guangxi was hit by a severe drought in 1963 and in order to 
against drought, the PBC of Guangxi province arranged loans for four times with a total 
amount of 54.8 million yuan. In this paper, I use “areas covered” and “area affected” to 
describe different extents of damage in crop production.3 I create drought affected index and 
flood affected index to reflect the weather damage in grain production. The drought and flood 
data come from Forty years of water conservancy construction achievements-Statistics of 
water conservancy published by the Department of Planning in Ministry of Water 
Conservancy in 1989. 
The index formula is as follows: 
 Drought affected index= Drought Affected Area Total Sown Area⁄  （4.1） 
 Flood affected index= Flood Affected Area Total Sown Area⁄  （4.2） 
                                                 
1 In June 1954, Liaoxi province and Liaodong province merged into Liaoning province. And the flood information 
was recorded in Liaoning financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 104. 
2 Recorded in Guangxi financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 420. 
3 The main types of natural disasters in China are drought and flood. To clarify, areas covered means around 10% of 
the total sown areas were covered by natural disaster and areas affected means around 30% of the total sown areas 
were affected by natural disasters. 
 46 
4.1.2 Econometrics analysis of agricultural Loans from 1950 to 1984 
In this part, I apply OLS regression to study influencing factors of formal credit. I take year 
and province as dummy variables and create 5 policy dummy variables to reflect the policy 
effects on credit. Furthermore, I add drought and flood affected index and lag one phase of 
grain output per capita as three continuous variables in this regression. I tried the rural 
population ratio and sown area per capita as continuous variables in this regression but neither 
were significant so I decided to remove these two variables in the regression. 
Table 4-2 Descriptive statistics of Agricultural loans used in analysis 
Variable Names 
Observation 
Number (N) 
Mean Std.dev. 
Min
. 
Max. 
Agricultural loan (10 thousand yuan) 590 
32642.1
8 
43729.4
4 
1 
53184
9 
Grain output per capita(ton) 595 0.37 0.15 0 2 
Drought affected area (%) 593 0.05 0.07 0 0.47 
Flood affected area (%) 593 0.02 0.04 0 0.40 
The first establishment of ABC (0/1) 51 0.09 0.28 0 1 
The second establishment of ABC 
(0/1) 
51 0.09 0.28 0 1 
The Great Leap Forward (0/1) 68 0.11 0.32 0 1 
The early stage of Cultural Revolution 
(0/1) 
102 0.17 0.38 0 1 
The late stage of Cultural Revolution 
(0/1) 
85 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 
In terms of 5 policy dummy variables, I create abcs, abct, glf, culre and culrelate. Variables 
abcs and abct represent for the establishment and existence of the Agricultural Bank of China. 
I set the dummy variable equal to 1 if ABC was established or existed in certain years. Abcs 
stands for ABC was established 1955 and lasted until 1957 when Central Committee decided 
to abolish it. Abct stands for ABC was re-established in 1963 and lasted until 1965. In order to 
study the effect of the Great Leap Forward movement, I create glf as a policy dummy variable. 
The Great Leap Forward started in 1958 and officially ended in 1960, but considering the 
lagged effect of this historical movement, I set 1958, 1959, 1960 and 1961 equal to 1 as if the 
 47 
Great Leap Forward movement happened. What needs to be mentioned is that three-year 
economic hardship started in 1959 and ended in 1961, in order to avoid collinearity problem, I 
only keep glf in this model. As for the 10-year Cultural Revolution, I divided 10 year into 2 
stages by taking 913 accident1 as a watershed moment. One is culre which stands for the early 
stage of the Cultural Revolution which started from 1966 to 1971, while culrelate stands for 
the late stage of the Cultural Revolution. The end of Lin Biao group marked the bankruptcy of 
the Cultural Revolution and Central government started to slightly adjust errors. To summary, 
all 5 policy dummy variables are time-invariant.  
My estimation consists of three equations, all of which include the three continuous variables 
to study the importance of grain production and natural disasters. In the first estimation, no 
policy dummy is included and in the second and third estimation all policy dummies are 
included.  
The full regression function (equation 4.3) is the following:  
 
it 0 1 , 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
( )
iti t it
t i it
ln agri graincp drind flind abcs
abct glf culre culrelate year procode u
    
     
−= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
 （4.3） 
Where i indexes a province and t indexes a year, and 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 stands for nominal agricultural 
loans, respectively. The expression 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 refers to lag one phase of grain output per 
capita. I lag the grain output per capita by 1 year because the grain output per capita in a given 
year does not affect credit until the subsequent year. Furthermore, both 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
are weather variables. According to gazetteers, Central government always issued and 
expanded credit supply when natural disasters happen. The reaction to disasters are quick and 
contemporaneous, then I maintain the current disaster index into this regression. Abcs, abct, glf, 
culre and culrelate stand for political variables and all of which are time-invariant, and tyear  
                                                 
1 913 Accident:13 September in 1971, vice chairman of the PRC Lin Biao fled to Mongolia with his followers. The 
airplane crashed in Windur Khan. This event marked the collapse of Lin Biao's counter-revolutionary group and 
objectively declared the bankruptcy of the "Cultural Revolution" both in theory and practice. 
 48 
stands for the year dummies and iprocode  stands for the province dummies. Finally, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term. 
In terms of the endogenous problems between grain output value and agricultural loan amount, 
I use lag of grain output per capita to avoid endogenous problem. Last year of grain output 
value might affect loan supply of current year, while last year grain output value will not be 
affected by current year loan supply. Then the endogenous problem can be avoided. 
In terms of the collinearity problem, I conducted variation inflation factor (VIF) to check the 
severity of multicollinearity. It showed a slight collinearity problem between culre and 
culrelate (value is bigger than 10). But putting important dummy variables are essential in 
historical problem analysis, so I chose to keep these two variables into this regression. 
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Table 4-3 Estimation of agricultural loan supply from 1950 to 1984 
Dependent Variable= Agricultural Loan(Natural Logarithm) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables 
No policy 
dummy 
OLS OLS Robust 
Constant 7.298*** 7.298*** 7.298*** 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.214) 
Graincp(lag) -0.672** -0.672** -0.672** 
 (0.264) (0.264) (0.300) 
drind 0.313 0.313 0.313 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.224) 
flind 0.912** 0.912** 0.912** 
 (0.426) (0.426) (0.411) 
abcs …. 2.677*** 2.677*** 
  (0.122) (0.202) 
abct … 3.529*** 3.529*** 
  (0.120) (0.201) 
glf … 3.178*** 3.178*** 
  (0.123) (0.213) 
culre … 3.334*** 3.334*** 
  (0.121) (0.203) 
culrelate … 4.008*** 4.008*** 
  (0.122) (0.203) 
year = 1952 0.595*** 0.595*** 0.595** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.247) 
year = 1953 1.278*** 1.278*** 1.278*** 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.215) 
year = 1954 1.418*** 1.418*** 1.418*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.207) 
year = 1955 1.698*** -0.979*** -0.979*** 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.0856) 
year = 1956 2.723*** 0.0467 0.0467 
 (0.122) (0.111) (0.0993) 
year = 1957 2.677*** …. … 
 (0.122)   
year = 1958 2.897*** -0.281** -0.281** 
 (0.120) (0.114) (0.122) 
year = 1959 2.867*** -0.311*** -0.311*** 
 (0.122) (0.114) (0.119) 
year = 1960 3.212*** 0.0337 0.0337 
 (0.123) (0.112) (0.112) 
year = 1961 3.178*** … … 
 (0.123)   
year = 1962 3.245*** 3.245*** 3.245*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.203) 
year = 1963 3.326*** -0.203* -0.203** 
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 (0.122) (0.112) (0.100) 
year = 1964 3.430*** -0.0996 -0.0996 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.0969) 
year = 1965 3.529*** … … 
 (0.120)   
year = 1966 3.638*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 
 (0.120) (0.110) (0.0784) 
year = 1967 3.714*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.0761) 
year = 1968 3.713*** 0.379*** 0.379*** 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.0725) 
year = 1969 3.719*** 0.385*** 0.385*** 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.0835) 
year = 1970 3.664*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 
 (0.119) (0.112) (0.0980) 
year = 1971 3.334*** … … 
 (0.121)   
year = 1972 3.409*** -0.599*** -0.599*** 
 (0.123) (0.112) (0.0696) 
year = 1973 3.480*** -0.528*** -0.528*** 
 (0.120) (0.112) (0.0658) 
year = 1974 3.608*** -0.400*** -0.400*** 
 (0.121) (0.111) (0.0673) 
year = 1975 3.756*** -0.252** -0.252*** 
 (0.121) (0.111) (0.0689) 
year = 1976 4.008*** … … 
 (0.122)   
year = 1977 4.084*** 4.084*** 4.084*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.203) 
year = 1978 4.247*** 4.247*** 4.247*** 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.202) 
year = 1979 4.412*** 4.412*** 4.412*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.205) 
year = 1980 4.568*** 4.568*** 4.568*** 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.217) 
year = 1981 4.639*** 4.639*** 4.639*** 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.215) 
year = 1982 4.784*** 4.784*** 4.784*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.217) 
year = 1983 4.914*** 4.914*** 4.914*** 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.226) 
year = 1984 5.350*** 5.350*** 5.350*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.239) 
province = 2, gansu -1.336*** -1.336*** -1.336*** 
 (0.0801) (0.0801) (0.0824) 
province = 3, guangxi -0.680*** -0.680*** -0.680*** 
 (0.0787) (0.0787) (0.0694) 
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province = 4, guizhou -1.345*** -1.345*** -1.345*** 
 (0.0803) (0.0803) (0.0703) 
province = 5, heilongjiang -0.423*** -0.423*** -0.423*** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.140) 
province = 6, henan 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.226** 
 (0.0798) (0.0798) (0.101) 
province = 7, hubei -0.420*** -0.420*** -0.420*** 
 (0.0780) (0.0780) (0.0707) 
province = 8, jiangxi -0.992*** -0.992*** -0.992*** 
 (0.0803) (0.0803) (0.0763) 
province = 9, jilin -0.859*** -0.859*** -0.859*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) 
province = 10, liaoning -0.602*** -0.602*** -0.602*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0791) (0.0678) 
province = 11, shandong 0.437*** 0.437*** 0.437*** 
 (0.0801) (0.0801) (0.0807) 
province = 12, shannxi -1.079*** -1.079*** -1.079*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.105) 
province = 13, shanxi -0.657*** -0.657*** -0.657*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0804) (0.0764) 
province = 14, sichuan -0.0101 -0.0101 -0.0101 
 (0.0835) (0.0835) (0.0852) 
province = 15, yunnan -1.269*** -1.269*** -1.269*** 
 (0.0793) (0.0793) (0.0759) 
province = 16, zhejiang -0.561*** -0.561*** -0.561*** 
 (0.0801) (0.0801) (0.109) 
Observations 539 539 539 
Adjusted R-squared 0.942 0.942 0.948 
note- Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.1.3 Estimation Results 
Table 4-3 reports the estimation results. According to the estimation 1-2 of equation (4.3), the 
proxy for grain output per capita is consistently significant at a 1% confidence level. Flood 
index is significant at a 5% confidence level whereas drought index is not significant. The 
signs of these continuous variables are all consistent with the direction hypothesized. For 
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instance, the negative coefficient of grain output per capita means that the increase in one ton 
of grain output per capita in last year will decrease the agricultural loan by 67%. This supports 
the notion that the increase of grain output value will increase income of farmers, consequently, 
it might reduce farmers’ dependence on formal credit. Both signs of weather disasters are 
positive which also support the hypothesis. One percent increase in flood affected ratio over 
total sown areas will increase the agricultural loan by 91% and 1% increase in drought affected 
ratio will increase the agricultural loan by 31%. 
In terms of 5 policy dummies variables, all policy dummies show positive effect on 
agricultural loans. The establishment of ABC in 1955 and 1957 imposed a positive effect on 
agricultural loans and the coefficient of second establishment of ABC is slightly larger than the 
first establishment which might due to the relatively mature development of ABC. For the 
Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution, all signs of variables are positive. 
During the Great Leap Forward movement, credit data in provinces was boosted under the 
atmosphere of exaggeration even if agriculture development fell behind. While interestingly, 
agricultural loans increased during the Cultural Revolution was mainly due to the slow 
development of agriculture. The coefficient of late stage of Cultural Revolution is slightly 
larger than the early stage of the Cultural Revolution which might affect Central government 
started to adjust mistakes after Lin Biao group collapsed. 
In order to better analyze the estimation with local financial gazetteers, I create the coefficient 
table for 16 provinces from 1950 to 1984. Considering the recorded data has affected the 
historical and political impacts on formal credit, I delete the policy effect from the second 
estimation of equation (4.3) to study the condition if those policies haven’t been carried out. 
Compared with two coefficient tables, all five policy dummies impose positive impact on 
agricultural loans among all provinces. The first coefficient table implies if ABC was 
established, the Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution happened, while 
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the second table implies the perfect condition if all policy and historical movements didn’t 
happen. The comparison shows that policy dummies absorb the year effects to these 5 policy 
dummies. 
The coefficients of 16 provinces don’t vary a lot among different provinces. Shandong, Henan, 
Sichuan and Anhui provinces have significantly higher agricultural loans than the rest 12 
provinces. Furthermore, the coefficient in Sichuan province is not significant while the 
coefficients of 15 provinces are all significant at a 1% confidence level. The sign of Sichuan 
province is negative in late stage of the Cultural Revolution which is also consistent with local 
gazetteer records. According to Sichuan financial gazetteers1, RCCs had been paralyzed and 
loan issued every year was less than 100 million yuan, as a result, credit per mu was less than 1 
yuan. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 9, page 217. 
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Table 4-4 Statistics of Coefficients under policy effects 
Year 
An 
hui 
Gan 
su 
Guan
g 
xi 
Gui 
zhou 
Heilo
ng 
jiang 
He 
nan 
Hu 
bei 
Jiang 
xi 
Ji 
lin 
Liao 
ning 
Shan 
dong 
Shan 
nxi 
Shan 
xi 
Si 
chuan 
Yun 
nan 
Zhe 
jiang 
1951 7.30 5.96 6.62 5.95 6.88 7.52 6.88 6.31 6.44 6.70 7.74 6.22 6.64 7.29 6.03 6.74 
1952 7.89 6.56 7.21 6.55 7.47 8.12 7.47 6.90 7.03 7.29 8.33 6.81 7.24 7.88 6.62 7.33 
1953 8.58 7.24 7.90 7.23 8.15 8.80 8.16 7.58 7.72 7.97 9.01 7.50 7.92 8.57 7.31 8.02 
1954 8.72 7.38 8.04 7.37 8.29 8.94 8.30 7.72 7.86 8.11 9.15 7.64 8.06 8.71 7.45 8.16 
1955 9.00 7.66 8.32 7.65 8.57 9.22 8.58 8.00 8.14 8.39 9.43 7.92 8.34 8.99 7.73 8.44 
1956 10.02 8.69 9.34 8.68 9.60 10.25 9.60 9.03 9.16 9.42 10.46 8.94 9.36 10.01 8.75 9.46 
1957 9.98 8.64 9.30 8.63 9.55 10.20 9.56 8.98 9.12 9.37 10.41 8.90 9.32 9.96 8.71 9.41 
1958 10.20 8.86 9.52 8.85 9.77 10.42 9.78 9.20 9.34 9.59 10.63 9.12 9.54 10.18 8.93 9.63 
1959 10.17 8.83 9.49 8.82 9.74 10.39 9.75 9.17 9.31 9.56 10.60 9.09 9.51 10.15 8.90 9.60 
1960 10.51 9.17 9.83 9.17 10.09 10.74 10.09 9.52 9.65 9.91 10.95 9.43 9.85 10.50 9.24 9.95 
1961 10.48 9.14 9.80 9.13 10.05 10.70 10.06 9.48 9.62 9.87 10.91 9.40 9.82 10.47 9.21 9.92 
1962 10.54 9.21 9.86 9.20 10.12 10.77 10.12 9.55 9.68 9.94 10.98 9.46 9.89 10.53 9.27 9.98 
1963 10.62 9.29 9.94 9.28 10.20 10.85 10.20 9.63 9.77 10.02 11.06 9.55 9.97 10.61 9.36 10.06 
1964 10.73 9.39 10.05 9.38 10.31 10.95 10.31 9.74 9.87 10.13 11.17 9.65 10.07 10.72 9.46 10.17 
1965 10.83 9.49 10.15 9.48 10.40 11.05 10.41 9.84 9.97 10.23 11.26 9.75 10.17 10.82 9.56 10.27 
1966 10.94 9.60 10.26 9.59 10.51 11.16 10.52 9.94 10.08 10.33 11.37 9.86 10.28 10.93 9.67 10.38 
1967 11.01 9.68 10.33 9.67 10.59 11.24 10.59 10.02 10.15 10.41 11.45 9.93 10.36 11.00 9.74 10.45 
1968 11.01 9.68 10.33 9.67 10.59 11.24 10.59 10.02 10.15 10.41 11.45 9.93 10.35 11.00 9.74 10.45 
1969 11.02 9.68 10.34 9.67 10.59 11.24 10.60 10.03 10.16 10.42 11.45 9.94 10.36 11.01 9.75 10.46 
1970 10.96 9.63 10.28 9.62 10.54 11.19 10.54 9.97 10.10 10.36 11.40 9.88 10.31 10.95 9.69 10.40 
1971 10.63 9.30 9.95 9.29 10.21 10.86 10.21 9.64 9.77 10.03 11.07 9.55 9.98 10.62 9.36 10.07 
1972 10.71 9.37 10.03 9.36 10.28 10.93 10.29 9.72 9.85 10.11 11.14 9.63 10.05 10.70 9.44 10.15 
1973 10.78 9.44 10.10 9.43 10.36 11.00 10.36 9.79 9.92 10.18 11.22 9.70 10.12 10.77 9.51 10.22 
1974 10.91 9.57 10.23 9.56 10.48 11.13 10.49 9.91 10.05 10.30 11.34 9.83 10.25 10.90 9.64 10.35 
1975 11.05 9.72 10.37 9.71 10.63 11.28 10.63 10.06 10.20 10.45 11.49 9.98 10.40 11.04 9.79 10.49 
1976 11.31 9.97 10.63 9.96 10.88 11.53 10.89 10.31 10.45 10.70 11.74 10.23 10.65 11.30 10.04 10.75 
1977 11.38 10.05 10.70 10.04 10.96 11.61 10.96 10.39 10.52 10.78 11.82 10.30 10.73 11.37 10.11 10.82 
1978 11.55 10.21 10.87 10.20 11.12 11.77 11.13 10.55 10.69 10.94 11.98 10.47 10.89 11.53 10.28 10.98 
1979 11.71 10.37 11.03 10.37 11.29 11.94 11.29 10.72 10.85 11.11 12.15 10.63 11.05 11.70 10.44 11.15 
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1980 11.87 10.53 11.19 10.52 11.44 12.09 11.45 10.87 11.01 11.26 12.30 10.79 11.21 11.86 10.60 11.31 
1981 11.94 10.60 11.26 10.59 11.51 12.16 11.52 10.95 11.08 11.34 12.37 10.86 11.28 11.93 10.67 11.38 
1982 12.08 10.75 11.40 10.74 11.66 12.31 11.66 11.09 11.22 11.48 12.52 11.00 11.43 12.07 10.81 11.52 
1983 12.21 10.88 11.53 10.87 11.79 12.44 11.79 11.22 11.35 11.61 12.65 11.13 11.56 12.20 10.94 11.65 
1984 12.65 11.31 11.97 11.30 12.23 12.87 12.23 11.66 11.79 12.05 13.09 11.57 11.99 12.64 11.38 12.09 
 
Table 4-5 Statistics of Coefficients without policy effects 
Year 
An 
hui 
Gan 
su 
Guan
g 
xi 
Gui 
zhou 
Heilo
ng 
jiang 
He 
nan 
Hu 
bei 
Jiang 
xi 
jilin 
Liao 
ning 
Shan 
dong 
Shan 
nxi 
Shan 
xi 
Si 
chuan 
Yun 
nan 
Zhe 
jiang 
1951 7.30 5.96 6.62 5.95 6.88 7.52 6.88 6.31 6.44 6.70 7.74 6.22 6.64 7.29 6.03 6.74 
1952 7.89 6.56 7.21 6.55 7.47 8.12 7.47 6.90 7.03 7.29 8.33 6.81 7.24 7.88 6.62 7.33 
1953 8.58 7.24 7.90 7.23 8.15 8.80 8.16 7.58 7.72 7.97 9.01 7.50 7.92 8.57 7.31 8.02 
1954 8.72 7.38 8.04 7.37 8.29 8.94 8.30 7.72 7.86 8.11 9.15 7.64 8.06 8.71 7.45 8.16 
1955 6.32 4.98 5.64 4.97 5.90 6.55 5.90 5.33 5.46 5.72 6.76 5.24 5.66 6.31 5.05 5.76 
1956 7.34 6.01 6.66 6.00 6.92 7.57 6.92 6.35 6.49 6.74 7.78 6.27 6.69 7.33 6.08 6.78 
1957 7.30 5.96 6.62 5.95 6.88 7.52 6.88 6.31 6.44 6.70 7.74 6.22 6.64 7.29 6.03 6.74 
1958 7.02 5.68 6.34 5.67 6.59 7.24 6.60 6.03 6.16 6.42 7.45 5.94 6.36 7.01 5.75 6.46 
1959 6.99 5.65 6.31 5.64 6.56 7.21 6.57 6.00 6.13 6.39 7.42 5.91 6.33 6.98 5.72 6.43 
1960 7.33 6.00 6.65 5.99 6.91 7.56 6.91 6.34 6.47 6.73 7.77 6.25 6.67 7.32 6.06 6.77 
1961 7.30 5.96 6.62 5.95 6.88 7.52 6.88 6.31 6.44 6.70 7.74 6.22 6.64 7.29 6.03 6.74 
1962 10.54 9.21 9.86 9.20 10.12 10.77 10.12 9.55 9.68 9.94 10.98 9.46 9.89 10.53 9.27 9.98 
1963 7.10 5.76 6.42 5.75 6.67 7.32 6.68 6.10 6.24 6.49 7.53 6.02 6.44 7.08 5.83 6.53 
1964 7.20 5.86 6.52 5.85 6.78 7.42 6.78 6.21 6.34 6.60 7.64 6.12 6.54 7.19 5.93 6.64 
1965 7.30 5.96 6.62 5.95 6.88 7.52 6.88 6.31 6.44 6.70 7.74 6.22 6.64 7.29 6.03 6.74 
1966 7.60 6.27 6.92 6.26 7.18 7.83 7.18 6.61 6.74 7.00 8.04 6.52 6.95 7.59 6.33 7.04 
1967 7.68 6.34 7.00 6.33 7.26 7.91 7.26 6.69 6.82 7.08 8.12 6.60 7.02 7.67 6.41 7.12 
1968 7.68 6.34 7.00 6.33 7.25 7.90 7.26 6.69 6.82 7.08 8.11 6.60 7.02 7.67 6.41 7.12 
1969 7.68 6.35 7.00 6.34 7.26 7.91 7.26 6.69 6.82 7.08 8.12 6.60 7.03 7.67 6.41 7.12 
1970 7.63 6.29 6.95 6.28 7.21 7.85 7.21 6.64 6.77 7.03 8.07 6.55 6.97 7.62 6.36 7.07 
1971 7.30 5.96 6.62 5.95 6.88 7.52 6.88 6.31 6.44 6.70 7.74 6.22 6.64 7.29 6.03 6.74 
1972 6.70 5.36 6.02 5.35 6.28 6.93 6.28 5.71 5.84 6.10 7.14 5.62 6.04 6.69 5.43 6.14 
1973 6.77 5.43 6.09 5.43 6.35 7.00 6.35 5.78 5.91 6.17 7.21 5.69 6.11 6.76 5.50 6.21 
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1974 6.90 5.56 6.22 5.55 6.48 7.12 6.48 5.91 6.04 6.30 7.34 5.82 6.24 6.89 5.63 6.34 
1975 7.05 5.71 6.37 5.70 6.62 7.27 6.63 6.05 6.19 6.44 7.48 5.97 6.39 7.04 5.78 6.49 
1976 7.30 5.96 6.62 5.95 6.88 7.52 6.88 6.31 6.44 6.70 7.74 6.22 6.64 7.29 6.03 6.74 
1977 11.38 10.05 10.70 10.04 10.96 11.61 10.96 10.39 10.52 10.78 11.82 10.30 10.73 11.37 10.11 10.82 
1978 11.55 10.21 10.87 10.20 11.12 11.77 11.13 10.55 10.69 10.94 11.98 10.47 10.89 11.53 10.28 10.98 
1979 11.71 10.37 11.03 10.37 11.29 11.94 11.29 10.72 10.85 11.11 12.15 10.63 11.05 11.70 10.44 11.15 
1980 11.87 10.53 11.19 10.52 11.44 12.09 11.45 10.87 11.01 11.26 12.30 10.79 11.21 11.86 10.60 11.31 
1981 11.94 10.60 11.26 10.59 11.51 12.16 11.52 10.95 11.08 11.34 12.37 10.86 11.28 11.93 10.67 11.38 
1982 12.08 10.75 11.40 10.74 11.66 12.31 11.66 11.09 11.22 11.48 12.52 11.00 11.43 12.07 10.81 11.52 
1983 12.21 10.88 11.53 10.87 11.79 12.44 11.79 11.22 11.35 11.61 12.65 11.13 11.56 12.20 10.94 11.65 
1984 12.65 11.31 11.97 11.30 12.23 12.87 12.23 11.66 11.79 12.05 13.09 11.57 11.99 12.64 11.38 12.09 
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4.1.4 Stories from provincial financial gazetteers 
Combining with 9 provincial financial gazetteers I collected (Henan, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hubei, 
Guangxi, Zhejiang, Gansu, Liaoning and Heilongjiang province), more interesting stories are 
revealed. 
During the Great Leap Forward movement, most of the provinces increased credit supply and 
some provinces even increased credit in kind. According to Gansu financial gazetteers 1 , 
communes and production brigades mandatorily collected farm tools, bricks and tiles and 
discounted them as deposits and then handed over to production brigades as credit. The 
balance of saving in kind has reached 120 million yuan in Gansu province. Why credit supply 
increased, one reason is under the wind of exaggeration and another is the credit management 
was transferred to lower level of administration2. For instance, Liaoning province issued 43.35 
million yuan of agricultural loans, with a loan balance of 99.7 million yuan at the end of the 
year, an increase of 31.41 million yuan over 1957. 
Furthermore, usage of loans varies among different provinces. In Zhejiang Province, 
agricultural loans were mainly used in agricultural infrastructure to improve irrigation, water 
conservancy and fisheries. For instance, over 37.52 billion yuan was issued in Zhejiang 
province from 1958 to 1960, consequently, 690 new fishing vessels were created3. While loans 
were mainly used for communal dining, hogs farms and chicken farms in Liaoning province4.  
But on the other side, some provinces encountered imbalance of credit supply and demand and 
massive credit losses. 70.6% of RCCs encountered loss in Zhejiang province and 44% of 
RCCs were unable to undertake loans to poor members due to insufficient fund. Another 
problem occurred during this period of time was some provinces reclaimed too many loans. 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Gansu| Province financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 396. 
2 Recorded in Zhejiang Province financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 203. 
3 Recorded in Zhejiang Province financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 244. 
4 Recorded in Liaoning Province financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 112. 
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For instance, Heilongjiang province issued 77.6 million yuan of agricultural loans and 
reclaimed 117.03 million yuan in 1958. The recovery rate of loans was 150.8%, 41% higher 
than that in 19571. 
Another interesting aspect is about the change of structure of agricultural loans. Agricultural 
loan consists of collective loan, commune loans, township enterprise loan and special purpose 
loans. The proportion of collective loans has increased during this period of time, while the 
proportion of farmer loans decreased. Take Yunnan as an example, collective loans in 1960 
has increased by 66.7% compared with 1957. Sichuan province also started to increase 
collective loans after 1955. Mentioned in Henan rural financial gazetteers2, banks seldom 
issued loans to farmers after People's Commune Movement. After 1961, collective loans in 
Yunnan province started to decline year by year until 1970. 
Year 1962 was a turning point. In 1962, Central government started to collect unpaid loans and 
put 90% of agricultural loans into production. Central government collected loans more than 
issuing loans and as a result, loan difference reached 0.33 billion yuan, consequently, the 
amount of currency in circulation decreased by 40 million yuan.  
During the Cultural Revolution, some provinces issued more collective loans to support 
agriculture mechanism. In 1975, Heilongjiang province issued a total of 79.24 million yuan in 
equipment loans for agriculture production, accounting for 49.6% of the total agricultural loans 
issued in that year, an increase of 14.7% over 1974 3 . According to Liaoning financial 
gazetteers4, Liaoning province issued 87.60 million yuan of commune loans in the first half of 
1972 and agricultural equipment loans accounted for 29.49% of the total loans.  
                                                 
1 Recorded in Heilongjiang financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 127. 
2 Recorded in Henan rural financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 146. 
3 Recorded in Heilongjiang financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 130. 
4 Recorded in Liaoning financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 272. 
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Furthermore, the turnover rate of agricultural loans was low and some provinces had difficulty 
in reclaiming loans. According to Yunnan financial gazetteers1, banks and communes were 
unable to issue and use loans, consequently, a large amount of agricultural loans were used to 
support “cutting into mountains, transferring the land, and building into Dazhai mode”. During 
the Cultural Revolution, a total of 486.35 million yuan of agricultural loans were issued in 
Yunnan province and 39.73 million yuan was uncollectible due to mistakes.  
After 1978 reform, the People’s Bank of China in Zhejiang Province started to carry out a 
policy which emphasizes economic benefits and commodity development in rural areas. The 
target of rural credit policy was mainly focused on transferring traditional rural economy to 
professional, commercial and modern rural economy. For instance, over 1.2 billion yuan of 
loans was issued to individual farmers in 1984 which helped 0.93 million professional rural 
households. And village enterprise loans accounted for 75% of the total balance of agricultural 
loans.   
4.2 Analysis of Interest Rate of Agricultural Loan from 1950 to 1984 
4.2.1 Theoretical framework 
In this paper, I assume a downward sloping demand curve for credit (Shown in Figure 4-2 and 
Chapter 2). In China, interest rates of formal finance were set by Central government. Interest 
rates might vary with change in types of loans but not with the loan amount. Interest rates data 
for agricultural production in the following section come from three local gazetteers and China 
Rural Finance Yearbook. Furthermore, the nominal agricultural loan is a year-end outstanding 
balance figure and the formula is the cumulative loans granted during the year minus the 
cumulative repayment of loans during the year. The outstanding balance represents the demand 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Yunnan financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 48. 
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of agriculture-related activities and is an effect of supply and demand in agricultural credit 
market. 
 
Figure 4-2 Elasticity of Credit 
 
4.2.2 Estimation Results 
In this part, I analyze the relationship between the interest rate and agricultural loan on 
province base. The equation is as follows: 
 ( ) 0 1 , 1 2 3 4ln ln( )it i t t it it itagri graincp ir drint flind u    −= + + + + +  （4.4） 
Where i indexes a province and t indexes a year, and 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 stands for nominal agricultural 
loans, respectively. The expression 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 refers to lag one phase of grain output per 
 61 
capita. And I take natural log of the interest rate to analyze the elasticity of loan demand. 
Given the difficulty of data collection, interest rate was set the same for each province but 
varied in different years. Furthermore, both drindit and flindit are weather variables. Finally, 
itu  is the error term. 
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Table 4-6 Estimation of Demand Elasticity from 1950 to 1984 
Dependent Variable: Agricultural Loans (Natural Logarithm)  
Independent 
Variables 
Hubei Guangxi Heilongjiang Liaoning Sichuan Anhui Yunnan Gansu 
Graincp(Lag) 10.59*** 12.73*** -2.434* 5.861*** 20.28*** 2.71 14.46** 5.392* 
 (2.068) (3.164) (1.398) (1.51) (3.97) (1.921) (5.758) (3.025) 
lnir -0.640*** -1.080*** -0.672* -1.117*** -1.217*** -0.454** -0.900*** -1.043*** 
 (0.202) (0.224) (0.332) (0.211) (0.201) (0.22) (0.231) (0.185) 
drind 3.667** 6.077** 2.186 3.503* 5.044** 1.284 10.10*** 3.149** 
 (1.716) (2.806) (5.413) (1.957) (1.93) (2.06) (3.611) (1.52) 
flind 0.249 23.4 10.05** 1.493 18.92 1.22 61.10** 43.04*** 
 (2.648) (16.9) (3.974) (4.198) (11.14) (2.365) (24.76) (7.691) 
Constant 6.805*** 6.829*** 12.23*** 8.830*** 7.218*** 10.24*** 5.449*** 8.555*** 
 (0.913) (1.111) (0.871) (0.631) (0.971) (0.76) (1.798) (0.94) 
Observations 34 34 33 34 34 32 34 34 
R-squared 0.668 0.663 0.406 0.635 0.755 0.224 0.613 0.735 
Independent 
Variables 
Shandong Shanxi Shannxi Zhejiang Guizhou Henan Jilin Jiangxi 
Graincp(Lag) 5.572** 11.74*** 13.22*** 15.48*** 4.321 0.691 5.766*** 13.73*** 
 (2.211) (3.124) (3.364) (2.425) (3.513) (1.999) (1.59) (2.043) 
lnir -0.872*** -0.826*** -0.964*** -1.326*** -0.940*** -1.291*** -1.562*** -0.719*** 
 (0.182) (0.192) (0.206) (0.236) (0.187) (0.181) (0.289) (0.167) 
drind 5.319*** 0.185 0.0454 9.081 6.133** 12.05*** 9.722*** 6.050* 
 (1.702) (1.246) (2.197) (9.28) (2.381) (3.754) (3.317) (2.998) 
flind 4.493* -0.568 9.720** 16.28** 67.67*** 14.32 2.705 2.465 
 (2.221) (9.992) (4.305) (7.35) (15.46) (9.419) (2.507) (3.855) 
Constant 10.16*** 7.208*** 6.390*** 5.377*** 8.676*** 11.87*** 7.562*** 4.556*** 
 (0.709) (0.994) (1.02) (0.99) (1) (0.639) (0.932) (0.928) 
Observations 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 
R-squared 0.599 0.596 0.586 0.735 0.668 0.68 0.609 0.762 
note- Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The regression results are shown in Table 4-6. All signs of interest rate coefficients are 
negative which indicate when interest rate decreases, agricultural loans will increase. The 
negative sign implies rural credit market is demand-dominant. Interest rates of 14 province are 
significant at a 1% confidence level and interest rates of Heilongjiang and Anhui province are 
significant at a 10% confidence level at least. Interestingly, coefficients of interest rate in 7 
provinces are bigger than 1, which suggests that the quasi-equilibrium interest rate is highly 
elastic. For instance, 1% increase in interest rate in Henan province will cause 1.29% decrease 
in agricultural loans in Henan. Reviewing the interest rate policy from 1950 to 1984, interest 
rate continues to be lowered to encourage agricultural mechanism and support agricultural 
collectives while at the same time, agricultural loans were unrealistically issued without a 
scientific credit management system. Due to nominal data of agricultural loans and interest 
rates, the elasticity might not reflect the real elasticity of the agricultural credit market at that 
time, but it provides us with some thoughts on interest rate elasticity of credit demand during 
that period of time. 
In terms of natural disasters impact, the sign of drought coefficient are positive in each 
provincial regression which is consistent with economic theory, implying a positive 
relationship between drought and credit. While for flood coefficients, all provinces except 
Shanxi province have positive signs and the coefficient of Shanxi is small and not significant. I 
can still imply a positive relationship between flood and credit supply. 
Furthermore, lag one phrase of grain output seems to have a positive effect on agricultural 
loans in each province which shows an opposite trend with the provincial panel data. One 
reason for this is the provincial margin effect might be different from the panel effect. 
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4.3 Analysis of Provincial RCC Loans from 1950 to 1984 
4.3.1 Data Review 
In terms of RCC loans, I collect RCC loans for eight provinces from local financial gazetteers. 
RCC loans refers to total outstanding loans provided by RCCs in a year and are mainly issued 
for farmers. The data of eight provinces is continuous from 1954 to 1984. 
Table 4-7 Annual growth rate of RCC Loans among 8 provinces from 1954 to 1984 
Province 1955-1956 1958-1961 1966-1971 1971-1976 1978-1984 
Hubei 169.0% -6.4% 2.3% 14.5% 35.6% 
Henan 136.4% 9.5% 11.6% 22.7% 33.6% 
Jiangsu 549.5% -17.7% 2.0% 23.6% 49.5% 
Liaoning 148.1% -3.9% 3.5% 13.5% 51.8% 
Sichuan 266.8% 14.4% 7.4% 10.7% 36.9% 
Gansu 379.7% -9.1% 10.8% 19.3% 29.7% 
Yunnan 150.4% -0.5% 7.7% 4.0% 44.3% 
Heilongjiang 288.9% 6.0% 12.0% 13.5% 34.8% 
Mean 261.1% -0.9% 7.2% 15.2% 39.5% 
Min 136.4% -17.7% 2.0% 4.0% 29.7% 
Max 549.5% 14.4% 12.0% 23.6% 51.8% 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
Shown in Table 4-7, RCC loans of all provinces skyrocketed from 1955 to 1956 and loans in 
Jiangsu province even increased 5 times. While during the Great Leap Forward movement, 
RCC loans of 5 province had negative annual growth rates which indicate that RCC operation 
was negatively affected in that period of time. Furthermore, RCC loans during the Cultural 
Revolution have recovered and RCC loans of 7 provinces grew at a higher rate in the late stage. 
After establishing the Rural Household Responsibility system in 1978, RCC operation 
gradually returned to a normal level and RCC loans grew rapidly. 
In terms of farmer loans, I collect farmer loans of 6 provinces from local financial gazetteers 
and divide farmer loans by rural population to get farmer loans per capita. The table 4-8 
presents farmer loans per capita in Hubei, Henan, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Yunnan and Heilongjiang 
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from 1954 to 1984. Farmer loans per capita grew slowly until 1979. Most of farmer loans from 
1954 to 1978 were around 1 yuan or 2 yuan per capita. After 1978, farmer loans per capita 
increased quickly and for instance, farmer loans per capita in Henan province even doubled 
within a year.  
Table 4-8 Farmer Loans per capita in 6 provinces from 1954 to 1984 
Year 
Hube
i 
Hena
n 
Jiangs
u 
Liaonin
g 
Sichua
n 
Yunna
n 
Heilongjiang 
1954     0.07 0.24  
1955     0.23 0.68  
1956   1.26  0.65 1.02  
1957 1.25  0.97  0.56 1.12  
1958 2.19  1.44  0.77 1.33 0.73 
1959 2.14  0.98 1.75 0.88 1.13 1.09 
1960 1.69  1.38 1.80 0.82 1.74 1.16 
1961 1.45  1.13 1.78 0.60 1.42 0.85 
1962 1.55  1.11 1.43 0.64 1.15 0.76 
1963 2.13 1.59 1.01 1.47 0.87 1.19 0.41 
1964 2.22 1.11 1.02 1.70 1.13 1.67 1.95 
1965 2.15 1.13 1.21 2.09 1.20 1.69 1.43 
1966 2.55 1.12 1.26 2.25 1.53 1.75 2.04 
1967 2.35 1.24 1.26 2.38 1.75 1.63 1.99 
1968 2.37 1.26 1.16 2.39 1.71 1.96 1.96 
1969 2.37 1.33 1.13 2.49 1.71 1.99 2.31 
1970 2.32 1.31 1.19 2.37 1.60 2.04 2.12 
1971 2.06 1.23 0.93 2.10 1.60 2.04 2.17 
1972 2.03 1.21 0.89 2.14 1.56 2.41 2.17 
1973 2.01 1.14 0.73 1.91 1.43 2.20 1.90 
1974 2.09 1.11 0.81 1.78 1.39 2.28 1.85 
1975 2.23 1.06 0.74 1.62 1.48 2.27 1.65 
1976 2.18 1.04 0.70 1.70 1.83 2.25 1.75 
1977 2.23 1.04 0.68 1.54 1.59 2.23 1.70 
1978 2.11 1.53 0.66 1.42 1.55 2.23 1.52 
1979 2.32 3.50 0.56 1.35 1.44 2.35 1.37 
1980 2.84 5.94 0.60 1.59 2.57 3.20 1.35 
1981 4.04 8.79 0.45 2.21 3.01 4.87 1.83 
1982 7.15 22.99 0.85 3.76 5.90 8.61 3.20 
1983 19.84 25.03 2.84 9.11 11.96 15.95 5.00 
1984 19.85 34.87 10.93 30.41 21.97 31.60 18.98 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
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4.3.2 Econometrics analysis of RCC loans from 1958 to 1961 
Shown in Table A-2, annual growth rate of RCC loans is negative during the Great Leap 
Forward in eight provinces. In this part, I try to analyze influencing factors of RCC loans 
during the Great Leap Forward movement. Steel construction is one of the most important 
features of that period. I collected steel output value for Hubei, Liaoning, Gansu, Yunnan and 
Heilongjiang province from the book A compilation of 60 year statistics in China. As a 
measurement for the extent of Great Leap Forward, I use year over year steel output growth 
rate in six provinces in the regression. Furthermore, I lag the growth rate of grain output per 
capita as another independent variable.  The increase of grain output per capita of last year 
might affect the demand of rural credit.   
Then equation is as follows: 
 0 1 2 , 1it it i t i itRccloan Steel Grainpc Year   − = +  +  + +  （4.5） 
Where i indexes a province and t indexes a year, and  itRccloan  stands for growth rate of 
RCC loans. The expression ∆𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡  refers to growth rate of steel output value and 
i,t-1grainpc  refers to growth rate of grain output per capita (lag one phrase). And tyear  stands 
for the year dummies and itu  is the error term. 
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4.3.3 Estimation Results 
Table 4-9 Estimation of RCC Loans from 1954 to 1961 
Dependent Variable: RCC loans Growth Rate 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS Robust 
   
Grain per capita (Lag) 1.010 1.010* 
 (0.588) (0.526) 
Steel output growth rate (%) -0.265** -0.265** 
 (0.0994) (0.0940) 
Year 1959 -0.954*** -0.954*** 
 (0.226) (0.244) 
Year 1960 -0.821*** -0.821*** 
 (0.230) (0.236) 
Year 1961 -1.472*** -1.472*** 
 (0.307) (0.251) 
Constant 1.240*** 1.240*** 
 (0.204) (0.177) 
   
Observations 24 24 
R-squared 0.671 0.671 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
, 11.240 0.265* 1.01*
0.954*Year1959 0.821*Year1960 1.472*Year1960
it it i tRccloan Steel Grainpc − = −  +  −
− −
 （4.6） 
Table 4-9 represents the estimation results. The coefficient of steel output growth rate is 
significant at a 5% confidence level and negative sign implies steel construction negatively 
affected the RCC loans during the Great Leap Forward movement. 1 unit increase in steel 
output growth rate will decrease RCC loans growth rate by 0.27 unit. The increase of steel 
output value implies provinces mobilize their rural labor force and RCC cadres in pursing the 
Leap's goals and ruin the RCC loans operation. Furthermore,  the change of grain output per 
capita of last phrase imposes a positive effect on RCC loans change in the current phrase. Year 
1959, 1960 and 1961 are all significant at a 1% confidence level, suggesting that those years 
might capture some common effects, such as RCCs operation were negatively affected.  
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Furthermore, lag one year of grain per capita is significant at a 10% confidence level and the 
positive sign implies when grain per capita last year increases, RCC loans of current year will 
also increase. In the provincial agricultural analysis, lag one year of grain per capita implies a 
negative relationship between grain output and agricultural loans. Based on that regression, 
increase of grain output means the increase of farmers’ income to some extent, consequently, 
formal channel of agricultural loans will be affected. But the positive sign here implies RCC 
loans might face more serious credit constraint in rural areas. 
4.3.4 More stories from local financial gazetteers 
RCC loans include farmer loan, collective agricultural loan, town enterprise loan and other 
rural industrial and commercial loans. Among them, farmer loan is the main part of RCC loans. 
Take Yunnan province for an example1, farmer loans usually account for 70%-80% of the total 
RCC loans from 1953 to 1984. From 1955 to 1984, farmer loans encountered a rapid 
development from 1955 to 1956 and stayed stagnated during the Great Leap Forward 
movement and the Cultural Revolution and restarted to grow after 1978. 
During the advanced agricultural cooperatives movement, farmer loans increase rapidly. 
According to Liaoning financial gazetteers2, the balance of farmer loans reached 32 million 
yuan by the end of 1956, increasing by 115% compared to 1955. Banks and RCCs issued 55.3 
million yuan within a year. For the usage of loans, 13 counties brought 6,743 water wagons, 5 
counties bought 180 water distributors, 6 counties built 39 small reservoirs and bought 
2,365,000 kilos seeds, and 9 counties bought 557 rubber wagons.  
After 1956, farmer loans began to slow down due to different reasons. With the development 
of rural cooperatives, RCCs started to have sufficient funds to support the living or production 
difficulties of farmers, consequently, banks reduced the issuance of farmer loans year by year. 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Yunnan financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 53. 
2 Recorded in Liaoning financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 108. 
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Taking Liaoning province1 for an example, issuance of farmer loans decreased from 32.1 
million yuan at the end of 1956 to 8.93 million yuan at the end of 1960, with an average annual 
decrease of 27.35%. Though there was an increase of 8.8% in 1961, farmer loans continued to 
drop by 15.5% by the end of 1962. Another reason is that the farmer loans is negatively 
affected by the Great Leap Forward movement. According to Sichuan financial gazetteers2, 
from 1959 to 1961, 1.2 billion yuan of collective agricultural loans were issued to support steel 
construction and farmer loans stagnated. 
The situation got worse after 1961. Large amounts of RCCs’ fund were occupied by 
production teams, other rural units and leaders themselves. In 1963, 88.4 million yuan of 
farmer loans were issued in Sichuan province to farmers with 70% for hogs breeding and 20% 
for food and illness. In 1965, rural areas launched “Four Clean-up” campaign and then Central 
government issued special interest-free loans to support poor farmers. The maturity of loan 
term is 1 to 3 years. From 1971 to 1979, RCCs in Liaoning province issued 9.95 million yuan 
farmer loans each year on average, which accounted for only 5.3% of the total loans. 
4.4 Analysis of City-level Agricultural Loans from 1950 to 1980 
4.4.1 Data Review 
Agricultural cooperative banks were established in 1951, consequently, agricultural loans 
increased in 1952. Based on the local financial gazetteers from 71 cities (Also shown in Table 
4-10), the agricultural loans from 41 cities increased and only 2 cities (Huaiyi and Wuhu city) 
showed a decline. 27 cities doubled agricultural loans in 1952. With the rapid development of 
advanced agricultural cooperatives from 1955 to 1956, agricultural loans from banks increased 
a lot. According to local financial gazetteers, 56 out of 58 cities increased their agricultural 
loans only 2 cities(Dan dong and Ezhou city) showed declines.  During the Great Leap 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Liaoning financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 105. 
2 Recorded in Sichuan financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 91. 
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Forward movement, 47 of 60 cities increased their agricultural loans while only 13 
cities(Abazhou, Baoji, Danyang, Hanzhong, Jiaxing, Nanning, Putian, Qingyang, Qiqihar, 
Urumchi, Yichang, Yuhang and Zhaotong cities) showed declines. The boost of agricultural 
loans reflected the anti-conservatives political atmosphere. During the Cultural Revolution, 
nationwide agricultural loans showed stagnation while growth trends varied among different 
cities. According to gazetteers, 47 out of 66 cities showed growth in agricultural loans and 5 
cities (Dandong, Ezhou, Lian yungang, Binzhou and Nningbo) stagnated and 14 
cities(Wenshan, Guiyang, Yiyang, Putian, Yuxi,Neijiang, Liuan, Hengyang, Changsha, Loudi, 
Shijiazhuang, Luoyang, Xiangtan and Urumchi) showed declines. After the end of the Cultural 
revolution, ABC was established for the fourth time and the Rural Household Responsibility 
system was spread in China. 51 out of 62 cities increased agricultural loans from 1979 to 1980 
and only 11 cities(Zhangye, Shiyan, Shijiazhuang, Kunming, Putian, Haixi, Suicounty, Leshan, 
Wuhu, Changchun and Urumchi city) showed declines. 
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Table 4-10 Growth Rate of Agricultural Loan from city-level financial gazetteers 
City 1951-1952 1955-1956 1958-1961 1966-1976 
Abazhou 1069% 153% -16% 18% 
Anqing 322% 199% 77% 9% 
Baoji 23% 230% -26% 18% 
Beihai 564% 13% 12% 14% 
Binzhou  385% 4% 0% 
Changchun  113% 58% 10% 
Changsha   212% -6% 
Chaozhou 57% 613% 45% 5% 
Chifeng   20% 9% 
Chuxiong 332% 88% 13% 3% 
Dandong  -67% 67% 0% 
Danyang 177% 404% -13% 4% 
Dehong  85% 6% 8% 
Dukou    17% 
Ezhou 99% -83% 20% 0% 
Greaterkhinganrange    6% 
Guiyang  500% 366% 4% -1% 
Haixi  248% 4% 46% 
Hanzhong 136% 361% -18% 7% 
Hefei  833% 16% 5% 
Hengyang 36% 315% 20% -4% 
Honghehani 207% 153% 9% 6% 
Huaihua  206% 74% 16% 
Huaiyin -6% 264% 12% 4% 
Hunanmiaozu 39% 340% 11% 1% 
Jiaxing  469% 60% -14% 10% 
Jilin   24% 6% 
Kunming  146% 19% 10% 
Leshan 361% 148% 91% 18% 
Liangzhou 1039% 30% 43%  
Lianyungang 63% 247% 9% 0% 
Linfen 38% 114% 1% 10% 
Liuan  527% 257% 17% -4% 
Liupanshui 417% 130% 16% 2% 
Loudi  297% 867% 59% -6% 
Luoyang 54% 300% 54% -11% 
Luzhou  150%   
Miaozudongzu 137% 131% 31% 4% 
Nanning  296% 10% -48% 5% 
Nantong 308% 700% 19% 10% 
Neijiang  66% 31% -3% 
Ningbo  560% 454% 9% 0% 
Pengshui 200% 238% 39% 7% 
Putian 140% 98% -5% -2% 
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Qingyang 242% 255% -30% 19% 
Qiqihar  110% -5% 2% 
Shantou  289% 36% 3% 
Shaoyang 429% 573% 18% 4% 
Shenyang 96% 59% 59% 1% 
Shijiazhuang 159% 304% 28% -7% 
Urumchi   -19% -29% 
Wenshan  116% 0% -1% 
Wuhu -29% 21% 28% 10% 
Wuxi  245%  18% 
Xiangtan  120% 689% 36% -13% 
Yanbian  42% 165% 39% 10% 
Yiyang 6% 188% 24% -2% 
Yuhang  131% -30% 9% 
Yunfu  683% 17% 11% 
Yuxi  100% 263% 10% -3% 
Zhangye  969% 138% 5% 
Zhaoqing  237% 460% 23% 7% 
Zhaotong  457% 161% -13% 3% 
Zhenjiang 325% 482% 4% 2% 
Number of city 41 58 60 62 
Mean 260% 268% 23% 5% 
Min -29% -83% -48% -29% 
Max 1069% 969% 212% 46% 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
 
4.4.2 Econometrics analysis 
I collected agricultural loans of 45 cities from recorded city-level financial gazetteers and the 
data of 45 cities is continuous from 1950 to 1980. Data of 45 cities cover 20 provinces and 3 
major economic regions in China (Shown in Table 4-11). 
Table 4-11 Regression Data of Agricultural Loans from local financial gazetteers 
Economi
c 
 Regions 
Provinces Cities 
Eastern 
Fujian, Hebei, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Zhejiang 
Putian, Shijiazhuang, Anqing, Liuan, Wuhu, 
Zhaoqing, Chaozhou, Zhenjiang, Lianyungang, 
Nantong, Dandong, Shenyang, Ningbo 
Middle Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hefei, Guiyang, Luoyang, Ezhou, Hanzhong, 
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Hunan, Jilin, Shanxi Hunan Miao Autonomous Region, Huaihua, 
Loudi, Binzhou, Yiyang, Hengyang, Xiangtan, 
Shaoyang, Chanchun, Yanbian, Linfen 
Western 
Gansu, Shannxi, 
Chongqing, Guangxi, 
Guizhou, Qinghai, 
Sichuan, Yunnan 
Qingyang, Baoji, Pengshui, Nanning, Beihai, 
Miao Autonomous Region in Southeast 
Guizhou, Liupanshui, Haixizhou, Leshan, 
Abazhou, Neijiang, Yuxi, Honghehani, 
Chuxiong, Wenshan, Zhaotong 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Agricultural loans in 45 cities from 1950 to 1980 
 
I apply OLS model to analyze policy effects on city-level agricultural loans. Due to the 
difficulty of collecting city-level continuous data from 1950 to 1980, there is no continuous 
independent variables in this regression. But these dummy variables can also imply some 
interesting effects on agricultural loans. 
The equation is as follows: 
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( ) 0 1 2 3 4
4 5 6
ln it
i i it
agri abcs abct glp culre
culrelate year procode u
    
  
= + + + + +
+ + +
 （4.7） 
Where i indexes a province and t indexes a year, and itln(agri )  stands for natural logarithm of 
nominal agricultural loans, respectively. Abcs, abct, glf, culre and culrelate stand for political 
variables and all of which are time-invariant, and tyear  stands for the year dummies and 
iprocode  stands for the city dummies.  Finally, itu  is the error term. 
4.4.3 Estimation Results 
Table 4-12 represents the estimation results. Policy dummy variables abcs, abct, glp, culre and 
culrelate are all significant at a 1% confidence level. The positive signs of these policy 
dummies imply a positive relationship between agricultural loans and policies. The coefficient 
of abct is larger than abcs which shows the second establishment of ABC impose more 
positive effects on agricultural loans. The coefficient of culrelate is larger than culre which 
shows the late stage of the Culture Revolution impose more positive effect on agricultural 
loans. After the 913 Incident in 1971, Central government started to rectify mistakes gradually. 
Furthermore, the effect of policy dummy variables are additive. If both ABCs were established 
and the Great Leap Forward movement happened, agricultural loans would grow faster than if 
only one condition is achieved. To sum up, the establishment of ABC, the launch of the Great 
Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution all promote the boost of agricultural 
loans.  
In terms of city effects, the coefficients of 43 cities are significant at a 1% confidence level. 
The city variables Pengshui and Yuxi are not significant, suggesting that some effects might 
not be captured. Interestingly, city variables Dandong, Nantong and Wuhu show a negative 
sign of coefficient. 
 
( )
5 6
ln 0.18 4.383* 5.182* 5.502* 4.967*
5.568*
it
i i it
agri abcs abct glp culre
culrelate year procode u 
= + + + + +
+ + +
（4.8）  
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Table 4-12 Estimation Results of City-level Agricultural Loans 
Dependent variable= Agricultural Loan(Natural logarithm) 
VARIABLE
S 
OLS Robust 
VARIABLE
S 
OLS Robust 
abcs 4.383*** 4.383*** Chuxiong 1.838*** 1.838*** 
 (0.15) (0.25)  (0.17) (0.15) 
abct 5.182*** 5.182*** Dandong -2.287*** -2.287*** 
 (0.15) (0.25)  (0.17) (0.25) 
glp 5.052*** 5.052*** Ezhou 1.463*** 1.463*** 
 (0.15) (0.26)  (0.17) (0.13) 
culre 4.967*** 4.967*** Guiyang 0.590*** 0.590*** 
 (0.15) (0.25)  (0.17) (0.17) 
culrelate 5.568*** 5.568*** Haixizhou 1.750*** 1.750*** 
 (0.15) (0.26)  (0.17) (0.26) 
Year=1951 1.087*** 1.087*** Hanzhong 1.830*** 1.830*** 
 (0.16) (0.28)  (0.17) (0.13) 
Year=1952 2.036*** 2.036*** Hefei  0.895*** 0.895*** 
 (0.15) (0.27)  (0.17) (0.25) 
Year=1953 2.610*** 2.610*** Hengyang 3.125*** 3.125*** 
 (0.15) (0.28)  (0.17) (0.14) 
Year=154 3.030*** 3.030*** Honghehani 2.437*** 2.437*** 
 (0.15) (0.27)  (0.17) (0.12) 
Year=1955 -1.058*** -1.058*** Huaihua 2.139*** 2.139*** 
 (0.14) (0.11)  (0.17) (0.12) 
Year=1956 0.08 0.08 
Hunanmiaoz
u 
2.170*** 2.170*** 
 (0.14) (0.10)  (0.17) (0.12) 
Year=1957 - - Leshan 2.390*** 2.390*** 
    (0.17) (0.17) 
Year=1958 -0.440*** -0.440*** Lianyungang 0.830*** 0.830*** 
 (0.14) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.15) 
Year=1959 -0.397*** -0.397*** Linfen 0.872*** 0.872*** 
 (0.14) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.15) 
Year=1960 (0.08) (0.08) Liuan 3.288*** 3.288*** 
 (0.14) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.13) 
Year=1961 - - Liupanshui 1.192*** 1.192*** 
    (0.17) (0.13) 
Year=1962 4.991*** 4.991*** Loudi 1.866*** 1.866*** 
 (0.15) (0.27)  (0.17) (0.15) 
Year=1963 (0.12) (0.12) Luoyang 2.101*** 2.101*** 
 (0.14) (0.11)  (0.17) (0.17) 
Year=1964 (0.15) (0.15) 
Miaozudongz
u 
2.143*** 2.143*** 
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 (0.14) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.14) 
Year=1965 - - Nanning 0.829*** 0.829*** 
    (0.17) (0.22) 
Year=1966 0.21 0.207* Nantong -0.420** -0.420*** 
 (0.14) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.16) 
Year=1967 0.301** 0.301*** Neijiang 3.067*** 3.067*** 
 (0.14) (0.11)  (0.17) (0.14) 
Year=1968 0.252* 0.252** Ningbo 2.924*** 2.924*** 
 (0.14) (0.11)  (0.17) (0.17) 
Year=1969 0.304** 0.304*** Pengshui (0.22) (0.22) 
 (0.14) (0.10)  (0.17) (0.25) 
Year=1970 0.319** 0.319*** Putian 2.078*** 2.078*** 
 (0.14) (0.10)  (0.17) (0.14) 
Year=1971 - - Qingyang 1.786*** 1.786*** 
    (0.17) (0.16) 
Year=1972 -0.489*** -0.489*** Shaoyang 2.291*** 2.291*** 
 (0.14) (0.11)  (0.17) (0.15) 
Year=1973 -0.444*** -0.444*** Shenyang 2.983*** 2.983*** 
 (0.14) (0.11)  (0.17) (0.15) 
Year=1974 -0.396*** -0.396*** Shijiazhuang 1.818*** 1.818*** 
 (0.14) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.15) 
Year=1975 (0.18) (0.18) Wenshan 1.658*** 1.658*** 
 (0.14) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.12) 
Year=1976 - - Wuhu -0.566*** -0.566** 
    (0.17) (0.25) 
Year=1977 5.696*** 5.696*** Xiangtan 1.729*** 1.729*** 
 (0.15) (0.25)  (0.17) (0.20) 
Year=1978 5.901*** 5.901*** Yanbian 2.106*** 2.106*** 
 (0.15) (0.26)  (0.17) (0.14) 
Year=1979 6.115*** 6.115*** Yiyang 3.037*** 3.037*** 
 (0.15) (0.27)  (0.17) (0.13) 
Year=1980 6.288*** 6.288*** Yuxi (0.02) (0.02) 
 (0.15) (0.29)  (0.17) (0.13) 
Anqing -1.496*** -1.496*** Zhaoqing 2.562*** 2.562*** 
 (0.17) (0.22)  (0.17) (0.12) 
Baoji 1.855*** 1.855*** Zhaotong 1.719*** 1.719*** 
 (0.17) (0.15)  (0.17) (0.14) 
Beihai 1.478*** 1.478*** Zhenjiang 2.318*** 2.318*** 
 (0.17) (0.16)  (0.17) (0.14) 
Binzhou 2.420*** 2.420*** Constant (0.18) (0.18) 
 (0.17) (0.13)  (0.16) (0.26) 
Changchun -0.588*** -0.588***    
 (0.17) (0.16) Observations 1,374 1,374 
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Chaozhou 0.570*** 0.570*** R-squared 0.89 0.89 
 (0.17) (0.14)    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.5 Analysis of City-level RCC Loans from 1954 to 1980 
4.5.1 Data Review 
Shown in Table 4-13, RCC loans increased a lot from 1955 to 1956 due to the advanced 
agricultural cooperatives movement. Consequently, 16 cities doubled the RCC loans within a 
year. And interestingly, most of the cities decreased their RCC loans during the Great Leap 
Forward movement compared with the boost of agricultural loans at the same time. The 
decline of RCC loans might be affected by the transfer of RCC cadres to urban construction 
and the three-year economic hardship. While during the Cultural Revolution, almost all the 
recorded cities (22 out of 23 cities) had a positive annual growth rate of RCC loans. The 
average growth rate of early stage of the Cultural Revolution is slightly larger than the late 
stage of the Cultural Revolution. RCC loans of most recorded cities grew at a quicker rate after 
1978. 
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Table 4-13 Growth Rate of RCC Loans from city-level financial gazetteers 
City 
1955-
1956 
1958-
1961 
1966-
1971 
1972-
1976 
1966-
1976 
1978-
1980 
Abazhou 533% -3% 14% 12% 12% 29% 
Aksuregion   8% 0% 2% 14% 
Chuxiong 139% -9% 6% 3% 5% 27% 
Dali 85% -10% 9% 3% 6% 26% 
Danyang   1% 28% 12%  
Dukou    17% 13% 15% 99% 
Ezhou 5% -9% 11% 10% 12% 10% 
Hengyang 164% -6% -7% 14% 4% 25% 
Honghehani 136% 13% 11% 8% 10% 28% 
Huaihua 356% -12% 3% -3% 6% -5% 
Hunanmiaozu 344% -13%  -1% 0% 40% 
Jiaozuo 279% -4% -22% 27% -2% 40% 
Jilin  27% 11% 9% 9% 15% 49% 
Leshan 191% 23% 13% 13% 14% 34% 
Lincang 185% -7% 0% 1% 2% 15% 
Loudi 152% -19% 17% 11% 15% 16% 
Luoyang 176% 23% 20% 27% 21% 13% 
Nanping 176% 4% 3% 10% 5% 52% 
Qingyang 221% -18% 12% 14% 15% 16% 
Qiqihar 390% -48% 0% 43% 13%  
Shijiazhuang 149% 16% -2% 8% 4% 24% 
Wenshan 371% 5% 9% -1% 5% 14% 
Yuncheng 84% -15% 12% 14% 13% 18% 
Number of city 20 20 22 23 23 21 
Mean 208% -4% 7% 11% 9% 28% 
Min 5% -48% -22% -3% -2% -5% 
Max 533% 23% 20% 43% 21% 99% 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
 
4.5.2 Econometric Analysis 
In terms of data in the regression, I collected RCC loans of 23 cities from recorded city-level 
financial gazetteers and the data of 23 cities is continuous from 1954 to 1980. Data of 23 cities 
cover 12 provinces and 3 major economic regions in China.  
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Table 4-14 RCC Loans in 23 cities from 1954 to 1980 
Economic  
Regions 
Provinces Cities 
Eastern 
Fujian, Hebei, 
Guangdong,  
Nanping, Shijiazhuang, Chaozhou, 
Middle 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Jilin, Shanxi 
Luoyang, Jiaozuo, Ezhou, Hunan Miao 
Autonomous Prefecture, Huaihua, Loudi, 
Hengyang, Jilin, Yuncheng,  
Western 
Gansu, Guangxi, 
Sichuan, Yunnan 
Qingyang, Beihai, Leshan, Abazhou, 
Honghehani, Yuxi, Dali, Lincang, 
Chuxiong, Wenshan 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑙𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.9) 
4.5.3 Estimation Results 
 
Table 4-15 presents the estimation results. Policy dummies glp, culre and culrelate showed a 
positive relationship with RCC loans at a 1% confidence level. The coefficient of the late stage 
of the Cultural Revolution is slightly bigger than the coefficient of the early stage of the 
Cultural Revolution, which is consistent with former regression results. Interestingly, the signs 
of coefficients in Year 1966, 1967, 1968, 1972, 1973 and 1974 were significantly negative at a 
1% confidence level. 
 
Table 4-15 Estimation Results of RCC Loans 
Dependent Variable=RCC loans (Natural Logarithm) 
Independent Variables Robust 
Independent 
Variables 
Robust 
glp 2.314*** Year1978 3.278*** 
 (0.18)  (0.18) 
culre 2.583*** Year1979 3.333*** 
 (0.18)  (0.18) 
culrelate 3.097*** Year1980 3.711*** 
 (0.18)  (0.18) 
Year1955 0.800*** Beihai -0.293** 
 (0.20)  (0.13) 
Year1956 1.778*** Chaozhou 1.397*** 
 (0.19)  (0.14) 
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Year1957 1.837*** Chuxiong 2.094*** 
 (0.19)  (0.12) 
Year1958 0.19  Dali 2.060*** 
 (0.14)  (0.11) 
Year1959 (0.01) Ezhou 0.618*** 
 (0.10)  (0.12) 
Year1960 0.171** Hengyang 2.689*** 
 (0.08)  (0.12) 
Year1961 - Honghehani 1.723*** 
   (0.12) 
Year1962 2.142*** Huaihua 1.915*** 
 (0.18)  (0.12) 
Year1963 2.140*** Hunanmiaozu 1.707*** 
 (0.18)  (0.14) 
Year1964 2.213*** Jiaozuo (0.11) 
 (0.19)  (0.16) 
Year1965 2.163*** Jilin 2.168*** 
 (0.19)  (0.13) 
Year1966 -0.296*** Leshan 2.505*** 
 (0.10)  (0.13) 
Year1967 -0.196** Lincang 1.494*** 
 (0.09)  (0.12) 
Year1968 -0.187** Loudi 2.270*** 
 (0.09)  (0.13) 
Year1969 (0.11) Luoyang 0.561*** 
 (0.08)  (0.14) 
Year1970 (0.04) Nanping 2.818*** 
 (0.08)  (0.13) 
Year1971 - Qingyang 1.155*** 
   (0.13) 
Year1972 -0.357*** Shijiazhuang 1.783*** 
 (0.09)  (0.13) 
Year1973 -0.380*** Wenshan 1.385*** 
 (0.09)  (0.12) 
Year1974 -0.306*** Yuncheng 2.928*** 
 (0.09)  (0.12) 
Year1975 -0.161* Yuxi 1.591*** 
 (0.09)  (0.12) 
Year1976 - Constant 1.797*** 
   (0.22) 
Year1977 3.170*** Observations 594.00  
 (0.18) R-squared 0.91  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.6 Analysis of City-level Farmer Loans from 1956 to 1979 
From 1955 to 1956, most of recorded cities increase their farmer loans at a higher rate (Shown 
in Table 4-16).  Take Qiqihaer city for example, it increased farmer loans by 390%. While 
during the Great Leap Forward movement, farmer loans developed in the opposite direction. 
Only five cities (Anyang, Baise, Ezhou,and Leshan city) increased their farmer loans, all other 
recorded cities decreased their farmer loans. Furthermore, during the Cultural Revolution, 7 
out of 20 cities (Anyang, Baoding, Huaihua, Hunan miao autonomous, Nanning and 
Shijiazhuang city) had a negative annual growth rate. To sum up, farmer loans get less affected 
in the Culture Revolution than the Great Leap Forward movement.  
Table 4-16 Growth rate of Farmer Loans from city-level financial gazetteers 
  1955-1956 1958-1961 1966-1971 1972-1976 1966-1976 
Abazhou 150% -16% 8% 1% 4% 
Anyang  20% -2% -10% -6% 
Baise  5% 13% -5% 4% 
Baoding 284% -23% -29% 7% -12% 
Beihai 375% -6% 6% 2% 3% 
Dali 86% -12% 8% 2% 6% 
Ezhou 18% 122% 8% 1% 5% 
Guangyuan 153% -8% -1% 12% 4% 
Huaihua -16% -30% -7% 9% -1% 
Hunanmaiozu 344% 0% -7% 3% -3% 
Jilin  10% -2% -4% 2% 
Linfen 134% -53% 13% -2% 5% 
Loudi 327% -25% 4% 0% 3% 
Luoyang  -91% -6% 18% -4% 7% 
Nanning 218% 41% -13% -13% -13% 
Ningbo 81% -12% 6% -5% 0% 
Qiqihaer 390% -48% 0% 43% 13% 
Shijiazhuang 186% 0% 2% -8% -3% 
Yuxi 300% -24% 8% -13% 0% 
Zhangye 210% -14% 4% -4% 0% 
Number of city 17 20 20 20 20 
Mean 185% -4% 2% 1% 1% 
Min -91% -53% -29% -13% -13% 
Max 390% 122% 18% 43% 13% 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
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4.7 More Stories from City-level financial gazetteers 
By collecting over 71 city-level financial gazetteers, more interesting stories about agricultural 
credit are revealed. Most of financial gazetteers provide meaningful and detailed information 
about agricultural credit. Furthermore, In order to study the effect of historical policies on 
agricultural credit, 5 stages have been divided and I try to conclude features among different 
periods of time. 
4.7.1 Stage 1: from 1950 to 1954 
During this period of time, the theme of agricultural credit policy is to recover agricultural 
recovery and support the land reform. After the initial establishment, the PRC still encountered 
fiscal and economic difficulties and price instability. Farmers were facing difficulties in 
agricultural production and living. In order to quickly solve these problems, national banks 
decide to issue a mixed form of credit-both cash and in-kind form (Shown in Table 4-17). With 
the successful accomplishment of the land reform, the focus of agricultural credit policy 
started to shift from helping poor farmers to mutual-aid groups and agricultural production 
cooperatives. 
  
 83 
Table 4-17 Summary of Credit Issuance from 1950 to 1954 
City Year 
Credit 
Issuance 
Covered Farmers 
Cash 
In 
kind 
Hefei1 
1950-
1952 
8.30 43.9  
Huaihua2 
1950-
1952 
125.00 554  
Anqing3 1950 2.69  1715 Households, 6790 farmers 
 
1950-
1952 
9.37   
Putian4 1950 25.30 36.7 76 Villages 
Qingyang5 1950 9.90 6.6 1447 Farmers 
 1951 40.60   
Chaozhou6 1951 7.00   
 1952 46.00   
Luoyang7 
1953-
1954 
34.93  
191819 yuan to 13426 Households for 
agricultural production; 157506 yuan to 
10851 Households for living difficulty;  
3617 Households for other purposes. 
Shijiazhuang
8 
1950 6.87 896 662367 farmers 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
notes: The unit of cash is 10 Thousand yuan. The unit of in-kind credit is 10 Thousand Kilograms. 
 
4.7.2 Stage 2: from 1955 to 1957 
During this period of time, the theme of agricultural credit is to support the development of 
agricultural cooperatives. The purpose of loans changed from helping farmers maintain basic 
production to support agricultural production by increasing production equipment and 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Hefei financial gazetteers, Chapter 5, page 105. 
2 Recorded in Huaihua financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 123. 
3 Recorded in Anqing financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 322-324. 
4 Recorded in Putian financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 205. 
5 Recorded in Qingyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 115. 
6 Recorded in Chaozhou financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 997. 
7 Recorded in Luoyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 392. 
8 Recorded in Shijiazhuang financial gazetteers, Chapter 13, page 197-199. 
 84 
expanding reproduction. To solve farmers’ difficulties in agricultural cooperatives, Central 
government started to issue poverty cooperative fund.  
 
Table 4-18 Poverty Cooperative Fund from 1955 to 1957 
City Year 
Credit 
Issuance 
Covered Farmers 
Credit  
per 
farmer 
Hefei1 1955-1956 65.00 
7609 farmers in 184 
 agricultural 
cooperatives 
85 
Anqing2 1953-1957 4.90   
Liuan3 1955-1956 722.00   
Pengshui4 1955-1956 0.75 
709 farmers in 96  
agricultural 
cooperatives 
10.6 
 1955-1959 25.00 21000 farmers 11.9 
Putian5 1954-1956 211.40 65300 farmers 32 
Qingyang6 1955 0.99   
Qiandong7 
miaodong 
1955-1957 173.50     
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
notes: The unit of Credit Issuance is 10 Thousand yuan. The unit for credit per farmer is yuan. 
 
Table 4-19 presents the agricultural credit issuance from 1955 to 1957. According to 
Chaozhou financial gazetteers 8 , loans issued for mutual-aid groups and agricultural 
cooperatives accounted for 86.3% of the total loans and farmer loans only accounted for 13.7% 
in 1955. Furthermore, with the development of RCCs, farmer loans were mainly issued by 
RCCs. RCCs also increased agricultural collective loans during that period of time. 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Hefei financial gazetteers, Chapter 5, page 105. 
2 Recorded in Anqing  financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 322. 
3 Recorded in Liuan  financial gazetteers  Chapter 4, page 145. 
4 Recorded in Pengshui financial gazetteers, Chapter 5, page 64. 
5 Recorded in Putian financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 177. 
6 Recorded in Qingyang financial gazetteers Chapter 4, page 121. 
7 Recorded in Financial gazetteers of Miao and Dong Autonomous Prefecture in Eastern Guizhou province, Chapter 
5, page 49. 
8 Recorded in Chaozhou financial gazetteers, Chapter 59, page 997. 
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Table 4-19 Agricultural Credit Issuance from 1955 to 1957 
City Year 
Agricultural Loans 
Credit Issuance 
Average 
issuance 
 per year 
Anqing1 
1953-
1957 
63.61 12.722 
Chaozhou2 
1953-
1957 
624 124.8 
Putian3 
1953-
1957 
3417 683.4 
Qingyang4 1956 339.1 339.1 
City Year RCC loans Credit Issuance 
  RCC loans Farmer loans 
Qingyang5 1956 366.4  
 1957   
Shijiazhuang6 1955  101 
Shijiazhuang7 1957 1250.5  
Ezhou8 1957 125 119 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
notes: The unit of loan is 10 thousand yuan. 
 
4.7.3 Stage 3: from 1958 to 1961 
During this period of time, credit division the People’s commune was developed at accelerated 
speed. According to Liu’an financial gazetteers9, 3,056 advanced agricultural cooperatives 
were transformed into 148 communes within half a year. Besides, 4,166 rural cooperatives in 
Huaihua city were formed to 104 credit divisions of the People’s communes. Meanwhile, as 
financial gazetteers of Tujia and Miao autonomous prefecture of western Hunan province10 
mentioned, 135 credit division were built in May 1959. In the meantime, 664 cadres were 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Anqing financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 322. 
2 Recorded in Chaozhou financial gazetteers, Chapter 59, page 997. 
3 Recorded in Putian financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 177. 
4 Recorded in Qingyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, Page 121-122. 
5 Recorded in Qingyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 820. 
6 Recorded in Shijiazhuang financial gazetteers, Chapter 13, page 197. 
7 Recorded in Shijiazhuang financial gazetteers, Chapter 13, page 227. 
8 Recorded in Ezhou financial gazetteers, Chapter 6, page 105. 
9 Recorded in Liu’an financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 147. 
10 Recorded in financial gazetteers of Tujian and Miao autonomous prefecture of western Hunan, Chapter 4, page 
206. 
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transferred to lower levels cross the prefecture, including 305 bank cadres and 359 cadres of 
RCCs.  
 
Table 4-20 Summary of Agricultural Loans during the Great Leap Forward 
City Year Credit Issuance 
Anqing1 1958-1960 186.76 
Putian2 1958 1574 
 1959 1159 
 1960 997 
 1961 720 
 1962 632.8 
Chaozhou3 1958-1960 1855 
Liupanshui4 1958-1960 1382 
Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
Furthermore, agricultural loans were also developed at accelerated speed during this period. 
According to Anqing city financial gazetteers5, factories were built one after another in the 
upsurge of the Great Leap Forward movement and the credit division units increased from 49 
to 232 in late 1958. Shown in Table 4-20, agricultural loans in Putian city issued in 1958 were 
added up to 15.74 million yuan with a 9 million increase compared with 1957. The annual 
growth rate was 133.5%. However, in 1959, influenced by left-leaning thoughts, not only 
issuance continued to increase but recovery of loans reached a peak. Even some undue loans 
were recovered. As a result, a total of 17.27 million yuan agricultural loans were recovered in a 
year, which exceeded 5.68 million yuan than issuance. As recorded by Chaozhou city financial 
gazetteers6, a cumulative agricultural loans of 18.55 million yuan were issued from 1958 to 
1960, which were equivalent to three times of the total loans issued in the previous 5 years. 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Anqing financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 322. 
2 Recorded in Putian financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 170. 
3 Recorded in Chaozhou financial gazetteers, Chapter 59, page 997. 
4 Recorded in Liupanshui financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 64. 
5 Recorded in Anqing financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 263.  
6 Recorded in Chaozhou financial gazetteers, Chapter 59, page 997. 
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Particularly, the over 13.74 million yuan agricultural loans were issued in 1959, which were 
ten times of the agricultural loans issued in 1957. 
Meanwhile, another feature during the Great Leap Forward movement was the slow 
development of farmer loans. As recorded by the financial gazetteers of Miao and Dong 
autonomous1 regions of east Guizhou province, farmer loans were almost ceased except few 
loans for raising pigs after 1959. On the other side, collectives loans increased quickly. 
According to Ezhou city financial gazetteers2, the proportion of collective loans issued by 
RCCs increased from 7.4% in 1957 to 37.7% in 1958 and 70.1% in 1979 respectively. 
4.7.4 Stage 4: from 1962 to 1965 
Starting from 1962, Central government started to put forward adjustment policies to rectify 
mistakes of the Great Leap Forward movement. An 8-character policy “adjustment, 
consolidation, enrichment and improvement” was implemented. National banks decided to 
strengthen credit management and comprehensively eliminate irrational occupation of funds. 
As a result, the situation of blindly issuance was corrected. In the meantime, “Four Cleans 
Movement” campaign was launched in rural areas to provide interest-free loans for poor 
farmers and families around the country. 
  
                                                 
1 Recorded in financial gazetteers of Miao and Dong autonomous, Chapter 3, page 131. 
2 Recorded in Ezhou financial gazetteers, Chapter 3, page 49. 
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Table 4-21 Summary of Agricultural Credit from 1962 to 1965 
City Year 
Agricultural Loans 
Credit Issuance 
Putian1 1962 167 
Anqing2 1961-1965 159.97 
Putian3 1963-1965 1830 
 1963 450 
Qingyang4 1965 101.3 
City Year 
Rcc loans  
Issuance 
Putian5 1962-1965 1603 
Qingyang6 1961 222 
 1963 90.5 
 1965 182.8 
Luoyang7 1963-1965 1434 
             Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers. 
As recorded by Anqing city financial gazetteers8, agricultural loans were mainly for equipment 
loans including agricultural machinery, water conservancy. Simultaneously, long-term interest-
free loan of 146.8 thousand yuan were issued for collectives economy. While, the focus of 
RCC loans during this period of time was to solve difficulties of farmers both in agricultural 
production and living. Mentioned in Qingyang financial gazetteers9, RCC loans were mainly 
used for hogs farmers. While in Luoyang city10, 79.9% loans of RCC loans were used for 
supporting poor farmers. 
                                                 
1 Recorded in Putian financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 172. 
2 Recorded in Anqing financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 322. 
3 Recorded in Putian financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 170. 
4 Recorded in Qingyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 117. 
5 Recorded in Putian financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 205. 
6 Recorded in Qingyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 855. 
7 Recorded in Luoyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 420. 
8 Recorded in Anqing financial gazetteers, Chapter 12, page 323-324. 
9 Recorded in Qingyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 8, page 855. 
10 Recorded in Luoyang financial gazetteer, Chapter 4, 420-422. 
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4.7.5 Stage 5: from 1966 to 1976 
The Cultural Revolution was initially launched in 1966. During this period, many effective 
regulations were abolished. Besides, lots of bank cadres were transferred to rural areas. As a 
result, credit management was loosen and credit funds and fiscal funds were out of control. 
During this period, agricultural loan policy was mainly for supporting “learning from Dazhai 
in agriculture” to realize agricultural mechanization and expand irrigation and water 
conservancy projects. Agricultural loans were invested in a single direction and interest rate 
was too low to have economic benefits. As a result, RCCs suffered from great losses. 
According to Chaozhou city financial gazetteer1, 17 RCCs suffered from losses, accounting for 
80% of 21 RCCs across the whole city. To be worse, the loans were not issued following 
scientific principles. RCCs blindly supported collectives in agricultural mechanization and 
gradually had difficulties in reclaiming loans. As recorded by Hefei city financial gazetteer2, a 
cumulative agricultural loans of 17.122 million yuan were issued during the Cultural 
Revolution, but only 748 thousand yuan of agricultural loans were recovered. 
Table 4-22 Summary of Agricultural Loans during the Cultural Revolution 
City Year Credit issuance 
Hefei3 1966-1976 1712.2 
Huaihua4 1974-1978 3000 
Putian5 1966-1971 1240 
Qingyang6 1966 281.7 
Chaozhou7 1967-1976 1717 
            Source: A compilation of local financial gazetteers.
                                                 
1 Recorded in Chaozhou financial gazetteer, Chapter 59, page 1009. 
2 Recorded in Hefei financial gazetteer, Chapter 5, page 107. 
3 Recorded in Hefei financial gazetteers, Chapter 5, page 107. 
4 Recorded in Huaihai financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 124. 
5 Recorded in Putian financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 205. 
6 Recorded in Qingyang financial gazetteers, Chapter 4, page 112. 
7 Recorded in Chaozhou financial gazetteers, Chapter 59, Page 997. 
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CHAPTER 5 AN OVERVIEW OF CREDIT IN CHINA AFTER 1978 
5.1 Introduction 
In previous chapter I investigate agricultural credit within the collective era. In this chapter I 
provide, as a point of comparison credit and credit policies in the modern era. As previously 
discussed the two periods are distinguished by a centrally planned economy (1950 to 1978) 
and the development of a market economy (1978 to present). Publicly available data in the 
modern era is more readily available than the collective era, but most statistical yearbooks do 
not go back as far as 1978. For this reason the data sources and regional emphasis differ 
between the two time periods, largely because the collective era data sources were obtained 
from a scattering of local gazetteers and compiled for this study. Moreover, to fully 
understand the credit situation in rural China it is also important to distinguish between formal 
and informal sources of credit, These issues are discussed in relation to the modern era from 
approximately 1985 to 2009. 
5.2 Introduction of the survey 
In terms of loan demand of farmers, I adapt data from National rural fixed observation station 
survey1. The National rural fixed observation station was established in 1985 in line with rural 
economic reform and supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture in China. The station was 
established to make up for the lack of systematic investigations in rural areas and provide 
necessary support for policy research. This survey was conducted continuously in over 20,000 
rural households from 1985 to 2009. For year 1992 and year 1994, data of these two years are 
missing, I get an average value of 1991 and 1993, 1993 and 1995 respectively to fill in the 
missing data.  
For the survey data, the survey of National rural fixed observation station covers the whole 
country from 1986 to 2009 consecutively and therefore, is very representative. The National 
                                                 
1 National Rural Social-Economic Survey Data Collection was published by China Agricultural Press from 1986. 
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rural fixed observation system uses the classification method of sample selection based on 
various categories of villages, which includes different geographic features (mountains, hills 
and plains), different income levels (poor, middle-level, and rich farmers), and different 
planting types (Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries). In order to ensure the 
continuity of the survey, if any other household changes, it will be replaced by the similar 
village farmers. The annual survey continuously tracks 300 fixed observation stations, over 
20,000 village households, which can reflect the overall level of national situation. 
5.3 Informal Lending in Rural China (1986-2009) 
Informal lending1 has a long history in both cities and rural areas in China. Informal lending is 
built upon neighborhood kinship and geopolitical relations. It usually occurs between relatives 
and friends in rural areas and the interest rate is usually low or even free.   
In China, there are several forms of informal lending, which include Rotating Saving and 
Credit Association, Private Banking, lending among relatives or friends and rural cooperative 
fund (RCF)2. The specific category is shown in Table 4-1. 
Table 5-1 Form of Informal Lending 
Main Form Category 
Individual Mutual-aid Loan 
 Usury 
 Guarantor 
Organization Mutual-aid Association 
 Underground Bank 
 
Fund-raising company 
Rural Cooperative Fund 
note: Summarized by Chaoshun Pan and Kun Cheng(2005), “An Empirical Study on the Scale of 
Informal Lending in rural China”. 
                                                 
1 As defined by the Asian Development Bank ADB, 1990, informal finance is a financial sector that is not subject 
to government constraints on capital, reserves and liquidity, deposit and loan interest rates, mandatory credit. 
objectives, and audit reporting requirements. 
2 RCFs were essentially government-initiated and government-controlled financial institutions that were registered 
under the Ministry of Agriculture, Tsai(2002). 
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Before 1999, rural cooperative funds developed rapidly, posing a challenge to the status of 
RCCs. However, in the process of development, rural cooperative funds exceeded its scope 
and were not standardized. Consequently, the risk of RCFs was relatively high. It was 
uniformly cleared up and banned in 1999, forming a monopoly of informal loans in the 
unofficial lending market of farmers. 
Furthermore, the interest rate of informal lending is determined by various factors, like the 
overall supply and demand of loans in the market, the interest rate of formal financial 
institutions, inflation rate and the demographic culture. However, the setting of interest rate in 
China is not a result of static market equilibrium of credit market. Low interest rate or interest-
free informal lending is more typical in most parts of rural areas in China. 
Due to the reciprocity of informal lending in rural China, most of the informal lending is oral 
commitment and without collaterals. However, informal lending carries a “Debt of Gratitude”, 
which implies farmers might need to offer the same help when their relatives or friends 
borrow money in the future. The total scale of informal lending is large in China but it is small 
for each personal lending case.  
5.3.1 Data Selection 
I used continuous data from National rural fixed observation station. In this chapter, I will 
analyze the informal lending from 1986 to 2009 by three geographic regions (Eastern, Middle 
and Western) in China based on the survey data. The main focus of informal lending is the 
scale of lending, the preference of lending and the usage of lending. 
According to the economic development of different regions, National Bureau of Statistics 
divided China into three regions1-Eastern, Middle and Western regions. Each region contains 
several provinces. Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1 present the specific provincial division. 
                                                 
1 See:http://www.stats.gov.cn/ztjc/zthd/sjtjr/dejtjkfr/tjkp/201106/t20110613_71947.htm 
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Table 5-2 Classification of Three Regions in China 
Eastern Middle Western 
Beijing Shanxi Inner Mongolia 
Tianjin Anhui Chongqing 
Hebei Jiangxi Sichuan 
Shanghai Henan Guizhou 
Jiangsu Hubei Yunnan 
Zhejiang Hunan Tibet 
Fujian Jilin Shannxi 
Shandong Heilongjiang Gansu 
Guangdong  Qinghai 
Hainan  Ningxia 
Liaoning  Xinjiang 
  Guangxi 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2011 
 
Figure 5-1 Three Agricultural Economic Zones 
5.3.2 Data Review 
Based on the survey of National rural fixed observation station, I summarize the basic 
information of farmers among different regions. Shown in Table 5-3, the average planting area 
per household decreased from 9.2 mu1 per household in 1986 to 7.12 mu per household in 
                                                 
1 Mu is a unit of measurement in China. 1 Mu is equal to 0.067 Hectare. 
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2009 (note: 1 mu = 1/6th acre). Meanwhile, the farm size shrank from 4.79 per household in 
1986 to 3.92 per household in 2009. The shrinkage of farm size might be due to urbanization1 
and transfer of the rural labor force to urban areas. On the other side, rural income per 
household increased 10 times in 2009 compared with 1986 and proportion of farming income 
decreased from 0.66 to 0.29 which implies the diversification of income and farming income 
is no longer the main sources of household income in China. 
Table 5-3 Nationwide Farmer Information 
Year 
Planting area 
per household(mu) 
Family size 
Income from 
farming (%) 
Net 
 income (yuan) 
1986 9.20 4.79 0.66 2284.90 
1987 8.90 4.77 0.56 2944.67 
1988 9.32 4.80 0.53 3505.47 
1989 9.03 4.72 0.58 3721.78 
1990 7.98 4.70 0.58 3920.16 
1991 8.47 4.64 0.57 4093.32 
1992 8.27 4.57 0.52 5029.51 
1993 8.07 4.50 0.49 5965.70 
1994 7.95 4.44 0.52 7902.63 
1995 7.83 4.37 0.53 9839.56 
1996 7.78 4.33 0.51 10214.39 
1997 7.65 4.28 0.48 10576.02 
1998 7.76 4.24 0.48 10232.35 
1999 7.94 4.21 0.43 10255.84 
2000 7.44 4.17 0.38 10610.19 
2001 7.63 4.10 0.38 10855.78 
2002 7.56 4.09 0.36 11770.41 
2003 6.95 4.03 0.31 14101.74 
2004 7.34 3.99 0.35 15970.45 
2005 7.32 4.00 0.34 17999.36 
2006 7.32 3.98 0.32 19094.13 
2007 7.22 3.98 0.30 23314.76 
2008 7.16 3.98 0.29 26192.14 
2009 7.12 3.92 0.29 27146.63 
Mean 7.88 4.32 0.45 11147.58 
Min 6.95 3.92 0.29 2284.90 
Max 9.32 4.80 0.66 27146.63 
Skewness 0.84 0.34 -0.01 0.87 
                                                 
1 Urbanization was approved by the State Council in 1982. 
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Table 5-4 presents information of farmers in the Eastern region. The planting area per 
household in the Eastern region also showed a downward trend from 1986 to 2009 and the 
decline rate was slightly higher than national data. The planting area per household decreased 
from 6.35 mu in 1986 to 4.48 mu in 2009 with an annual decline rate of 29.4%. The average 
planting area was smaller than national data. Meanwhile the downward trend of family size 
was similar to the national data, decreasing from 4.47 people per household in 1986 to 3.87 
people per household in 2009 (likely due to the one-child policy). Net income per household 
increased faster from 2,791 yuan in 1986 to 34,229 yuan in 2009 with an increase rate of 
110%. At the same time, proportion of farming income also declined sharply, from 0.51 in 
1986 to 0.22 in 2009. It can be seen that in Table 5-4, the proportion of farming income to the 
total income of farmers in the Eastern region was always lower than national proportion ratio. 
Table 5-5 presents information of farmers in the Middle region. The average planting area per 
household in the Middle region was the highest in China and the decline rate was relatively 
small between 1986 and 2009. The planting area per household in the Middle region was 
11.92 mu in 1986 and 10.56 mu in 2009 with a decrease rate of only 11.4%. The dependence 
of farmers’ income on farming in the Middle region was also higher than that in the Eastern 
and Western regions. The proportion of farming income in the Central region had a national 
maximum of 0.80 in 1986. 
The proportion declined to 0.38 in 2009 but it still remained highest among three regions. 
Farmers’ income in the Central region increased 10 times between 1986 and 2009, which is in 
line with the national trend. Family size decreased from 4.79 in 1986 to 3.82 in 2009, which 
was also consistent with the national trend. 
Table 5-6 presents information of farmers in the Western region. The planting area per 
household decreased from 9.74 mu in 1986 to 5.98 mu in 2009 with a decrease rate of 38.6%. 
Interestingly, the decline rate of planting areas per household in the Western region was 
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highest among three regions. Despite the sharp decline in planting areas, family size remained 
largest. The net income of farmers was low at the very beginning compared with the Eastern 
and Middle region. However, from 1991 to 2008, net household income in the Western region 
was higher than the Middle region and the net household income has increased 10 times over 
23 years. 
To sum up, there is an imbalance in economic development among three regions. Farmers in 
the Eastern regions have the highest income and more versatile income structure while farmers 
in the Middle region rely more on farming activities. Farmers in the Western regions have a 
stable family structure. 
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Table 5-4 Farmer Information in the Eastern Region 
Year 
Planting area 
per 
household(mu) 
Family size 
Income from 
farming (%) 
Net 
income(yuan) 
1986 6.35 4.47 0.51 2791.31 
1987 6.19 4.48 0.43 3800.82 
1988 5.93 4.55 0.39 4692.34 
1989 5.68 4.52 0.44 4887.96 
1990 5.83 4.50 0.43 5051.11 
1991 5.43 4.42 0.41 5500.96 
1992 5.17 4.39 0.35 6888.93 
1993 4.90 4.35 0.32 8276.90 
1994 4.90 4.29 0.34 10810.71 
1995 4.89 4.23 0.35 13344.51 
1996 4.80 4.21 0.33 14041.10 
1997 4.86 4.15 0.31 14339.65 
1998 4.96 4.10 0.35 14005.37 
1999 5.28 4.10 0.30 14679.37 
2000 4.06 4.07 0.27 14682.32 
2001 4.61 3.99 0.26 14697.13 
2002 4.50 3.97 0.23 15930.42 
2003 4.35 3.89 0.22 18375.00 
2004 4.41 3.60 0.20 20188.32 
2005 4.32 3.95 0.25 23808.66 
2006 4.23 3.89 0.23 24238.05 
2007 4.51 3.93 0.21 28688.49 
2008 4.30 4.11 0.22 33044.40 
2009 4.48 3.87 0.22 34229.41 
Mean 4.96 4.17 0.31 14624.72 
Min 4.06 3.60 0.20 2791.31 
Max 6.35 4.55 0.51 34229.41 
Skewness 0.75 -0.18 0.43 0.72 
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Table 5-5 Farmer Information in the Middle Region 
Year 
Planting area 
per household(mu) 
Farmer size 
Income from 
farming (%) 
Net income(yuan) 
1986 11.92 4.79 0.80 2054.95 
1987 11.94 4.78 0.72 2541.03 
1988 11.82 4.74 0.67 2935.22 
1989 12.39 4.60 0.76 3153.34 
1990 9.78 4.60 0.74 3253.53 
1991 11.26 4.58 0.73 3259.68 
1992 10.88 4.49 0.70 3889.03 
1993 10.49 4.40 0.67 4518.37 
1994 10.48 4.32 0.72 6152.70 
1995 10.47 4.24 0.74 7787.02 
1996 10.63 4.19 0.73 8134.78 
1997 10.24 4.16 0.64 8410.29 
1998 10.39 4.11 0.62 7960.13 
1999 10.61 4.07 0.58 7752.17 
2000 10.23 4.02 0.56 7730.18 
2001 10.45 3.97 0.53 8367.85 
2002 11.06 3.98 0.55 9203.87 
2003 10.10 3.97 0.44 11113.62 
2004 10.91 3.88 0.36 13238.06 
2005 11.03 3.91 0.45 14421.68 
2006 11.02 3.93 0.44 16273.78 
2007 10.80 3.88 0.50 16795.71 
2008 10.74 3.68 0.41 21958.01 
2009 10.56 3.82 0.38 24291.34 
Mean 10.84 4.21 0.60 8966.51 
Min 9.78 3.68 0.36 2054.95 
Max 12.39 4.79 0.80 24291.34 
Skewness 0.90 0.42 -0.37 1.10 
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Table 5-6 Farmer Information in the Western Region 
Year 
Planting area 
per household(mu) 
Family size 
Income from 
farming (%) 
Net  
income(yua
n) 
1986 9.74 5.33 0.77 1800.17 
1987 8.14 5.26 0.64 2166.89 
1988 9.98 5.23 0.64 2790.91 
1989 9.11 5.16 0.65 2838.48 
1990 8.51 5.15 0.71 3231.01 
1991 8.34 5.05 0.70 3427.65 
1992 8.71 4.96 0.67 4104.86 
1993 9.08 4.86 0.65 4782.06 
1994 8.60 4.81 0.66 6349.76 
1995 8.11 4.76 0.67 7917.45 
1996 7.85 4.71 0.63 7819.87 
1997 7.68 4.64 0.62 8505.03 
1998 7.57 4.60 0.58 8642.53 
1999 7.67 4.57 0.57 7436.67 
2000 7.28 4.49 0.46 8553.23 
2001 7.51 4.42 0.45 8726.49 
2002 6.57 4.37 0.41 9423.42 
2003 5.99 4.08 0.35 11707.23 
2004 6.02 4.21 0.38 13727.21 
2005 6.00 4.20 0.37 14862.33 
2006 5.89 4.18 0.34 16285.45 
2007 5.82 4.21 0.35 18809.82 
2008 5.93 4.25 0.29 22502.73 
2009 5.98 4.16 0.31 22408.51 
Mean 7.59 4.65 0.54 9117.49 
Min 5.82 4.08 0.29 1800.17 
Max 9.98 5.33 0.77 22502.73 
Skewness 0.05 0.22 -0.30 0.91 
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5.3.3 Informal Lending in rural China from 1986 to 2009 
5.3.3.1 Loan Scale 
In this part, I divide informal lending loans amount by planting areas to get loan per mu to 
study the loan development from 1986 to 2009.   
Shown in Table 5-7, the average loan per mu increased from 1986 to 2009, with an average 
annual growth rate of 10.6%. It increased from 25.77 yuan in 1986 to 171.06 yuan in 2009. 
The growth rate of loans per mu in the Eastern region was 10.8%, followed by 8.6% in the 
Middle region and 15% in the Western region. The Western region had the fastest growth rate, 
while the Middle region had the slowest growth rate. In 1986, the average loan per mu was the 
highest in the Eastern region, followed by the Middle region and the Western region came last. 
But after the rapid growth from 1986 to 2009, the average loan per mu in the Western region 
reached 437.99 yuan in 2009, exceeding the Middle region by 266.93 yuan, while the Eastern 
region remained the highest.  
I divide years into two stages and the first stage is 1986 to 1996 based on the reform of RCCs1 
in 1996. The growth rate of loan per mu before 1996 was relatively quick, with an annual 
growth rate of 17.7%. From 1996 to 2009, the growth rate of loan per mu dropped 
significantly, with an annual growth rate of 5.4%. One reason for this might be ABC started to 
reduce supply farmer loans after 1996. This feature has also been shown in the Eastern, 
Middle and Western regions. The Western region maintained a faster growth rate than Eastern 
and Middle region. 
For informal loans per mu, the average informal loan per mu increased from 20.99 yuan to 
206.55 yuan in the past 23 years, with an average annual growth rate of 10.5%. The growth 
rate of informal loans was consistent with the growth rate of total loan which implies the loan 
structure was relatively stable. The growth of informal loans was 14.9% in the Western region 
                                                 
1 RCCs were independent from ABC after 1996 and were under direct control of the PBC. 
 101 
and was highest among three regions. The growth rate of informal loans in the Middle region 
was lowest and only 9.5%. In terms of absolute value, informal loans per mu was highest in 
the Eastern region which was more than three times the informal loans in the Middle region 
and two times of informal loans in the Western region. The annual growth rate of informal 
loans per mu was 21.3% in the Eastern region from 1986 to 1996, and fell to 2.1% from 1997 
to 2009; The growth rate was 16.9% in the Middle region from 1986 to 1996, and fell to 4.2% 
from 1997 to 2009. In the Western region, the annual growth rate of informal loans per mu 
was 24.4% from 1986 to 1996, and fell to 8.1% from 1997 to 2009. The Eastern region 
encountered an obvious drop from 1997 to 2009, while the Western region has the highest 
growth rate in both phases. 
 
Figure 5-2 Loan per Mu from 1986 to 2009 
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Table 5-7 Loan per mu of National Data from 1986 to 2009 
Year 
Total 
Loans 
Formal 
Loans 
Informal 
loans 
Interest-free 
informal lending 
1986 32.84 11.85 20.99  
1987 45.38 15.39 29.99  
1988 54.38 15.96 38.42  
1989 50.04 11.09 38.95  
1990 51.22 13.20 38.02  
1991 60.44 16.15 44.29  
1992 81.74 20.11 61.62  
1993 104.09 24.27 79.82 45.81 
1994 121.44 30.59 90.84 47.40 
1995 139.32 37.11 102.20 49.03 
1996 168.04 45.87 122.17 59.79 
1997 160.78 42.87 117.91 61.32 
1998 170.03 38.41 131.63 62.32 
1999 182.12 49.53 132.58 64.81 
2000 194.95 60.25 134.70 69.90 
2001 193.68 59.11 134.57 65.46 
2002 187.31 51.99 135.32 71.56 
2003 246.03 83.32 162.71 99.91 
2004 223.92 81.42 142.50 92.19 
2005 234.49 89.66 144.84 94.03 
2006 243.77 99.26 144.51 96.46 
2007 231.20 96.76 134.45 109.47 
2008 296.82 135.94 160.88 105.07 
2009 334.88 128.32 206.55 136.57 
note: The unit of loan is yuan per mu. 
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Table 5-8 Loan per mu in the Eastern Region from 1986 to 2009  
Year Total Loans Formal Loans Informal loans 
Interest-free 
 informal lending 
1986 59.32 19.21 40.11  
1987 83.26 24.47 58.79  
1988 118.19 25.83 92.36  
1989 107.14 20.58 86.56  
1990 91.24 19.65 71.59  
1991 125.95 25.33 100.62  
1992 181.91 27.41 154.51  
1993 243.92 29.70 214.22 111.44 
1994 276.10 37.32 238.78 98.67 
1995 308.35 44.96 263.39 85.87 
1996 357.51 79.77 277.73 117.09 
1997 309.72 41.78 267.94 132.62 
1998 353.58 48.11 305.47 134.01 
1999 386.04 80.66 305.38 129.66 
2000 490.75 130.60 360.15 160.30 
2001 451.64 126.44 325.19 144.31 
2002 377.93 75.28 302.65 132.89 
2003 424.17 112.11 312.05 189.40 
2004 411.83 127.63 284.20 173.54 
2005 463.73 144.17 319.56 199.12 
2006 494.59 146.48 348.11 218.94 
2007 416.43 143.46 272.97 199.76 
2008 629.22 300.69 328.53 182.17 
2009 623.01 260.76 362.25 215.13 
note: The unit of loan is yuan per mu. 
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Table 5-9 Loan per mu in the Middle Region from 1986 to 2009 
Year 
Total 
Loans 
Formal 
Loans 
Informal loans 
Interest-free 
 informal lending 
1986 25.77 10.24 15.52  
1987 33.01 12.60 20.41  
1988 40.61 14.18 26.43  
1989 30.65 7.19 23.46  
1990 36.98 9.95 27.03  
1991 39.90 11.88 28.02  
1992 46.79 13.17 33.63  
1993 55.91 14.55 41.37 27.88 
1994 70.03 19.62 50.41 33.95 
1995 84.17 24.70 59.47 40.03 
1996 97.60 23.78 73.82 41.98 
1997 113.66 30.23 83.43 47.14 
1998 104.33 20.86 83.47 45.29 
1999 104.15 20.81 83.34 46.99 
2000 104.01 22.10 81.91 53.46 
2001 92.18 16.53 75.66 48.54 
2002 106.57 25.24 81.33 56.51 
2003 139.61 37.55 102.06 68.42 
2004 129.51 43.22 86.29 66.37 
2005 134.25 48.09 86.17 63.02 
2006 155.96 64.94 91.03 63.71 
2007 147.42 49.29 98.13 79.66 
2008 154.84 55.35 99.49 80.42 
2009 171.06 45.13 125.94 97.61 
note: The unit of loan is yuan per mu.  
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Table 5-10 Loan per mu in the Western Region from 1986 to 2009 
Year Total Loans 
Formal 
Loans 
Informal 
loans 
Interest-free 
informal lending 
1986 17.63 6.94 10.69  
1987 27.65 10.68 16.97  
1988 28.60 11.32 17.28  
1989 35.93 10.04 25.88  
1990 35.13 12.17 22.96  
1991 44.19 16.87 27.32  
1992 57.77 23.47 34.31  
1993 77.20 29.53 47.67 25.71 
1994 87.99 34.85 53.14 29.98 
1995 100.08 40.80 59.28 34.76 
1996 142.88 48.27 94.61 45.24 
1997 122.69 51.81 70.88 26.48 
1998 146.49 53.64 92.85 36.71 
1999 148.08 59.00 89.08 40.01 
2000 169.57 76.38 93.19 42.50 
2001 176.66 78.76 97.89 29.42 
2002 204.11 83.85 120.26 50.99 
2003 324.97 143.00 181.97 85.40 
2004 288.84 117.00 171.85 79.10 
2005 275.52 120.28 155.23 73.10 
2006 249.59 105.87 143.72 71.15 
2007 250.69 141.00 109.69 85.60 
2008 325.17 131.27 193.90 90.78 
2009 437.99 176.46 261.53 149.76 
note: The unit of loan is yuan per mu. 
5.3.3.2 Loan Preference Analysis 
In order to study the loan preference of farmers, I create the preference ratio to analyze the 
proportion of formal loans to informal loans. If the ratio is smaller than 1, it implies farmers 
prefer to borrow from informal channel. 
 
 
Loan Preference Ratio
 
Formal Loan
Informal Loan
=  （5.1） 
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Shown in the figure 5-3, farmers rely more on rural informal channels than formal channels. 
The average national ratio was 0.46 which implied formal loans was less than half of informal 
loans. Among them, the ratio in the Eastern region was 0.35, followed by 0.42 in the Middle 
region and 0.69 in the Western region. It shows that the closer to the eastern part of China, the 
stronger preference to informal lending. When divided years into different phases, the loan 
preference ratio shows a trend from high to low and then started to rebound. Based on the 
national data, the preference ratio was 0.44 from 1986 to 1989 and then was 0.36 from 1990 to 
2002, and 0.65 from 2003 to 2009 respectively. The quick increase from 2003 to 2009 might 
be explained by the development of RCCs and Micro-Credit companies in rural areas. 
Interestingly, the loan preference ratio in the Western region kept increasing in the three 
phases and the ratio remained highest among three regions which implied the inclination of 
national credit in the Western regions. 
Table 5-7 also presents the proportion of interest-free loans to total loans from 1993 to 2009. 
The average proportion of interest-free loans in national data was between 35% and 40% and 
remained a stable trend. The average proportion of interest-free loans to total loans was 38.6%, 
of which in the Eastern region was 37.7%, in the Middle region was 48.7%, and in the 
Western region was 28.2%. Interestingly, the Middle region had the highest ratio of informal 
loans and Western region has the lowest ratio. To conclude, even though formal loans 
developed quickly, interest-bearing informal loans were dominant in the Western rural credit 
market. 
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Figure 5-3 Loan Preference in three regions from 1986 to 2009 
 
5.3.3.3 Usage of Loans 
In terms of the usage of loans, the average proportion of loans for living in national data was 
53.3% from 1995 to 2009, which reflected that the distribution of loans between living and 
production was relatively balanced. The proportion of loans for living in the Eastern region 
was similar to national proportion with an average ratio of 53.91%. The proportion of loans 
used for living in the Middle region was 56.09%, which is slightly higher than Eastern region. 
The proportion of loans for living in the Western region was 43.25%, which is the lowest 
among the three regions. It can be seen that loans in the western region were more used for 
production while loans in the Middle regions were tended to living purpose. 
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Table 5-11 Nationwide Usage of Loan from 1995 to 2009 
Year 
Living 
loan 
Production 
loan 
Living (%) Production (%) 
1995 500.94 589.91 45.92% 54.08% 
1996 693.32 614.00 53.03% 46.97% 
1997 734.15 495.81 59.69% 40.31% 
1998 713.79 605.68 54.10% 45.90% 
1999 808.09 637.93 55.88% 44.12% 
2000 717.33 733.33 49.45% 50.56% 
2001 913.92 564.45 61.82% 38.20% 
2002 674.15 741.42 47.62% 52.36% 
2003 860.64 849.29 50.33% 49.67% 
2004 758.90 868.56 46.63% 52.85% 
2005 866.00 848.10 50.52% 49.41% 
2006 1000.10 782.80 56.09% 43.87% 
2007 999.20 819.60 54.94% 49.10% 
2008 1174.56 1084.85 51.99% 51.05% 
2009 1467.51 916.81 61.55% 38.45% 
Mean 858.84 743.50 0.53 0.47 
 
Table 5-12 Usage of Loan in the Eastern region from 1995 to 2009 
Year 
Living 
loan 
Production 
loan 
Living (%) Production (%) 
1995 498.71 856.70 33.07% 63.21% 
1996 872.05 843.98 50.82% 49.18% 
1997 954.88 550.36 63.44% 36.56% 
1998 928.17 825.59 52.92% 47.08% 
1999 1101.25 937.02 54.03% 45.97% 
2000 966.02 987.01 48.48% 50.54% 
2001 1335.52 746.53 64.14% 35.86% 
2002 788.85 912.45 46.38% 53.63% 
2003 1016.68 828.44 55.10% 44.90% 
2004 884.10 932.05 48.68% 51.32% 
2005 1104.10 899.20 55.11% 44.89% 
2006 1207.90 884.20 57.74% 42.26% 
2007 1186.50 812.90 63.18% 40.66% 
2008 1429.67 1457.14 52.84% 50.48% 
2009 1751.03 1040.04 62.74% 37.26% 
Mean 1068.36 900.91 0.54 0.46 
 
 109 
Table 5-13 Usage of Loan in the Middle region from 1995 to 2009 
Year 
Living 
loan 
Production 
loan 
Living (%) Production (%) 
1995 358.90 416.65 46.28% 53.72% 
1996 493.53 404.12 54.98% 45.02% 
1997 547.89 470.70 53.79% 46.21% 
1998 527.49 419.82 55.68% 44.32% 
1999 554.92 445.83 55.45% 44.55% 
2000 587.47 413.83 58.67% 41.33% 
2001 547.48 324.98 62.75% 37.25% 
2002 642.67 405.77 61.30% 38.70% 
2003 742.63 667.40 52.67% 47.33% 
2004 669.35 740.93 47.46% 52.54% 
2005 774.00 702.20 52.43% 47.57% 
2006 991.00 725.60 57.73% 42.27% 
2007 960.20 734.20 56.67% 43.33% 
2008 1035.36 747.40 58.08% 41.92% 
2009 1217.79 588.65 67.41% 32.59% 
Mean 710.05 547.21 0.56 0.44 
 
Table 5-14 Usage of Loan in the Western region from 1995 to 2009 
Year 
Living 
loan 
Production 
loan 
Living (%) Production (%) 
1995 239.88 408.12 37.02% 62.98% 
1996 363.23 521.24 41.07% 58.93% 
1997 304.16 433.60 41.23% 58.77% 
1998 325.11 590.36 35.51% 64.49% 
1999 419.13 516.67 44.79% 55.21% 
2000 357.77 630.03 36.22% 63.78% 
2001 459.73 651.49 41.37% 58.63% 
2002 548.02 533.52 50.67% 49.33% 
2003 804.90 1141.67 41.35% 58.65% 
2004 711.04 967.98 42.35% 57.65% 
2005 665.20 985.30 40.30% 59.70% 
2006 736.80 730.50 50.21% 49.79% 
2007 761.40 970.10 43.97% 56.03% 
2008 992.39 1019.68 49.32% 50.68% 
2009 1399.10 1220.00 53.42% 46.58% 
Mean 605.86 754.68 0.43 0.57 
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5.4 Formal Lending in Rural China (1979-2009) 
5.4.1 Introduction of Data from Other Sources 
In terms of the formal lending in China, I adapt the data from China Statistical Yearbook, 
China Rural Finance Yearbook, China Agricultural Economics Statistical Yearbook and 
Chinese Rural Finance Reports to try to analyze farmer loans provided by formal financial 
institutions. The Chinese government published farmer loans from 1979 to 1991 by province 
and from 2007 to present, but the data from 1992 to 2008 is missing. 
In this part, I mainly focus on RCC loans and farmer loans.  In terms of farmer loans, the first 
data source is China Rural Financial Yearbook1, which recorded farmer loans from 1979 to 
1989 in China. The second data source is China Rural Finance report2. After 1991, Central 
government stopped to release farmer loans  data in China Financial yearbook until 2007, so 
the data of farmer loans from 1992 to 2007 is missing. In order to better reflect the 
development of farmer loans, I divide loans by planting areas to get farmer loans per mu to 
analyze the features of farmer loans. 
For the data from other sources, they are mainly coming from authoritative official channels 
and most of financial data is recorded in nominal terms. The data during those historical 
movements (e.g Grain output value) might be modified by central government, but 
considering the difficulty of obtaining these data, I ignore the problem and try to adjust these 
from other sources. 
 
                                                 
1 China Rural Finance Yearbook was published by China Statistical Publishing House, 1992. 
2 China Rural Finance Report was initially published by the People’s Bank of China in 2007 and it is published per 
biennium. 
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5.4.2 Analysis of farmer loans from 1979 to 1989 
As it can be seen in Table 5-15, average annual growth rates of farmer loans in all provinces 
were over 20% from 1979 to 1989. The average growth rates for all provinces from 1985 to 
1989 were 10.8%, 27.7%, 26.3%, 10.3% and 4.4%, respectively. And the growth rate reached 
a peak in 1984. Farmer loans per mu in 20 out of 32 provinces increased by more than 100% 
in 1984. One of the reasons is due to 1978 reform and the Rural Household Responsibility 
system was established and developed after that. Another reason might be agricultural loans 
were out of control in 19841. After 1984, the growth rate has slowed down significantly.  
Farmer loans in Hebei, Guangdong and Shanxi provinces increased relative quickly from 1979 
to 1989, with a growth rate of 56%, 53% and 40% respectively. Meanwhile, farmer loans in 
Beijing, Shanghai and Neimenggu provinces increased at the slowest annual growth rate with 
27%, 25% and 24% respectively. The slow increase in Beijing and Shanghai might be the 
change of the focus of economic structure in these provinces. 
 
                                                 
1 See: The History of ABC (2000), Economic Science Press, Chapter 4, page 182. 
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Table 5-15 Farmer Loans per mu from 1979 to 1989 
Province 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Annual  
growth rate 
Beijing 0.88 0.95 1.06 1.12 1.52 9.18 7.87 6.95 8.03 9.42 8.13 25% 
Tianjin 0.41 0.57 0.68 0.94 1.87 12.17 13.66 14.80 20.18 22.71 22.09 49% 
Hebei 0.58 0.65 1.10 1.79 3.32 13.33 14.49 22.72 33.66 42.75 48.37 56% 
Shanxi 0.65 0.75 1.49 2.60 6.72 20.70 19.78 23.80 27.62 32.74 38.69 50% 
Neimenggu 1.68 0.93 1.15 2.00 3.86 6.56 7.29 8.90 10.64 12.92 14.17 24% 
Liaoning 0.66 0.89 1.14 1.76 4.62 14.46 17.28 21.26 26.17 29.62 33.79 48% 
Jilin 0.41 0.64 0.68 1.08 4.39 16.99 21.83 26.66 31.63 31.17 17.42 46% 
Heilongjiang 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.70 1.59 8.26 9.49 9.89 11.13 11.32 11.90 43% 
Shanghai 0.53 1.19 1.21 1.28 2.16 4.54 3.78 5.93 8.66 8.68 5.57 27% 
Jiangsu 0.41 0.36 0.40 0.59 1.22 4.21 3.10 4.13 4.58 4.72 5.28 29% 
Zhejiang 0.72 1.09 1.20 1.50 2.79 6.81 7.37 13.11 17.22 18.24 20.91 40% 
Anhui 0.38 0.55 1.10 3.25 5.81 9.09 9.83 12.85 15.67 15.17 16.31 46% 
Fujian 0.85 1.10 2.67 4.65 7.41 15.72 17.97 25.24 32.75 30.87 34.86 45% 
Jiangxi 0.47 0.52 0.77 1.74 3.63 5.94 7.23 9.24 11.18 12.27 13.04 39% 
Shandong 0.45 0.45 0.64 0.79 1.84 8.51 9.18 12.27 15.24 16.10 17.00 44% 
Henan 0.61 0.77 1.69 3.11 4.72 11.83 13.02 17.43 23.74 26.00 29.35 47% 
Hubei 0.80 0.88 1.11 1.63 2.87 8.20 8.45 9.55 11.94 13.60 15.15 34% 
Hunan 0.47 0.66 1.20 2.23 3.23 6.34 7.38 10.39 14.69 14.97 15.80 42% 
Guangdong 0.82 2.25 3.90 6.13 8.87 17.71 21.52 29.92 39.08 50.85 58.32 53% 
Guangxi 0.90 1.17 1.98 4.90 6.65 11.10 14.11 18.25 24.28 24.16 26.04 40% 
Hainan        33.26 48.86 69.11 67.07  
Sichuan 0.94 1.50 1.73 3.18 6.24 11.79 11.65 14.90 18.55 18.05 19.88 36% 
Guizhou 1.46 2.24 3.85 5.55 7.52 10.40 11.14 14.06 16.43 17.41 16.82 28% 
Yunnan 1.17 1.54 2.60 4.84 9.02 17.19 18.77 22.09 26.83 27.84 26.26 36% 
 113 
Shannxi 0.64 0.82 1.29 2.69 5.00 11.61 11.90 17.20 23.09 25.36 28.01 46% 
Gansu 0.64 0.77 2.12 3.91 5.85 9.73 12.12 14.08 16.25 17.59 18.72 40% 
Qinghai 0.44 0.62 0.97 2.76 5.29 11.44 14.88 17.33 19.14 22.05 23.58 49% 
Ningxia 0.59 0.65 1.06 2.12 3.50 6.29 8.74 9.23 11.47 13.66 14.60 38% 
Xinjiang 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.42 0.84 4.50 5.39 6.43 8.18 9.58 11.80 43% 
Sources: China Rural Finance Yearbook 
note: The unit is yuan. Data of Hainan is missing for Hainan was established as a provincial administrative region on April 13, 1988. 
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From 1979 to 1991, RCCs were the main provider of farmer loans and on average 79.1% of 
total farmer loans were issued by RCCs. As it can be seen from Table 5-16, the proportion of 
farmer loans provided by RCCs in almost all provinces were over 50% except Gansu, Qinghai 
and Neimenggu province. Among them, almost all farmer loans in Beijing and Shanghai were 
provided by RCCs. In the more developed eastern provinces such as Tianjin, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Guangdong, RCCs provided more than 90% of the total farmer loans. 
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Table 5-16 Percentage of Farmer Loans issued by RCCs from 1979 to 1989 
RCC 
percentage 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Beijing 96.8% 97.1% 98.8% 99.3% 99.5% 99.2% 98.4% 98.6% 99.0% 99.3% 99.1% 
Tianjin 61.7% 75.3% 82.1% 87.4% 93.6% 91.3% 92.8% 94.7% 94.9% 94.5% 93.1% 
Hebei 53.9% 61.5% 78.1% 86.7% 92.5% 91.9% 91.5% 91.3% 88.0% 86.4% 85.8% 
Shanxi 74.4% 79.5% 89.2% 93.4% 93.7% 84.0% 83.0% 84.5% 85.1% 85.4% 85.9% 
Neimenggu 46.3% 51.4% 52.1% 48.2% 41.1% 50.7% 49.8% 48.7% 51.6% 54.4% 57.3% 
Liaoning 63.1% 67.8% 74.1% 83.2% 78.7% 85.0% 79.9% 80.8% 84.2% 85.7% 86.6% 
Jilin 83.4% 87.2% 95.6% 92.7% 45.4% 51.4% 44.0% 43.2% 47.9% 50.0% 9.9% 
Heilongjiang 62.5% 62.0% 65.7% 68.4% 48.5% 34.4% 34.5% 39.3% 46.5% 48.9% 50.9% 
Shanghai 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Jiangsu 54.0% 51.1% 43.2% 57.7% 88.3% 96.8% 95.4% 96.1% 97.0% 96.5% 97.2% 
Zhejiang 84.3% 90.0% 91.8% 94.1% 96.6% 97.2% 96.0% 97.2% 95.9% 94.3% 94.1% 
Anhui 64.9% 77.1% 80.5% 57.7% 46.2% 66.8% 70.0% 74.6% 78.1% 82.5% 81.8% 
Fujian 92.3% 94.2% 95.8% 96.6% 92.8% 91.1% 87.8% 85.3% 80.2% 79.2% 80.9% 
Jiangxi 81.6% 84.8% 85.5% 84.9% 75.0% 83.4% 83.3% 85.3% 85.5% 86.4% 88.8% 
Shandong 73.3% 76.3% 85.1% 89.8% 79.4% 85.4% 85.4% 87.9% 87.7% 87.4% 87.7% 
Henan 62.7% 74.3% 79.5% 72.4% 71.0% 74.7% 74.9% 77.2% 79.9% 79.7% 80.0% 
Hubei 86.3% 87.6% 86.0% 89.1% 88.0% 86.4% 84.7% 86.1% 87.8% 88.3% 89.8% 
Hunan 91.5% 92.2% 93.3% 93.7% 90.0% 84.9% 84.5% 87.3% 86.8% 85.8% 87.2% 
Guangdong 91.8% 97.0% 97.5% 97.1% 96.3% 93.8% 92.2% 91.4% 90.8% 90.3% 90.4% 
Guangxi 72.9% 79.6% 84.8% 89.8% 89.7% 88.0% 86.5% 87.7% 87.4% 85.4% 87.4% 
Hainan        77.3% 71.2% 66.6% 64.9% 
Sichuan 76.7% 85.9% 87.0% 92.2% 95.6% 95.3% 94.0% 92.6% 92.7% 91.9% 92.4% 
Guizhou 84.5% 90.0% 90.5% 93.1% 93.7% 90.4% 89.0% 85.2% 82.8% 81.1% 81.8% 
Yunnan 88.5% 93.1% 87.2% 85.1% 85.1% 82.6% 79.3% 78.6% 77.3% 76.1% 77.8% 
Shannxi 75.4% 76.7% 84.5% 88.2% 89.7% 82.8% 79.1% 81.6% 81.1% 81.6% 83.5% 
Gansu 54.3% 65.7% 44.8% 40.3% 34.8% 45.9% 44.8% 47.0% 50.3% 49.6% 53.5% 
Qinghai 71.8% 76.0% 70.8% 63.9% 60.4% 54.5% 47.4% 44.0% 43.0% 42.4% 42.5% 
Ningxia 57.4% 62.9% 58.8% 54.9% 65.3% 72.3% 70.1% 68.4% 64.7% 71.2% 76.5% 
Xinjiang 93.7% 92.7% 94.4% 92.0% 86.3% 76.0% 70.4% 66.6% 67.1% 64.8% 68.2% 
Sources: China Rural Finance Yearbook,1992. 
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5.4.3 Analysis of farmer loans from China Rural Finance Report 
Starting from 2007, Central government started to publish China Rural Finance Report to 
provide development of rural finance in China. There are four categories of loans about 
agriculture. To be specific, Agri-related loan stands for all loans related to agriculture and is a 
broad concept. Rural loan stands for all loans issued to rural areas in China and village 
enterprise is part of rural loans. Agricultural production loan stands for loans for agricultural 
production. Farmer loan stands for loans issued to farmers and individuals in China. 
Table 5-17 represents agricultural credit development from 2007 to 2016. From 2007 to 2016, 
farmer loans increased at an annual growth rate of 20%, which is significantly higher than that 
of agricultural production loans (10%), of rural Loan (18%) and Agri-related Loan (19%).  
The proportion of farmer loans to rural loans has gradually increased from 26.6% in 2007 to 
30.8% in 2016. 
Table 5-17 Summary of Agricultural Credit from 2007 to 2016 
Year 
Farmer 
Loan 
Agricultural Production 
Loan 
Rural 
Loan 
Agri-related 
Loan 
2007 13399 15055 50384 61151 
2008 15170 15559 55569 69124 
2009 20134 19488 74551 91316 
2010 26043 23045 98017 117658 
2011 31023 24436 121469 146016 
2012 36195 27261 145467 176310 
2013 45047 30437 173025 208893 
2014 53587 33394 194383 236002 
2015 61488 35137 216055 263522 
2016 70846 36627 230092 282336 
Annual  
Growth 
Rate 
20% 10% 18% 19% 
Source: China Rural Finance Report, 2016 
note: The unit of loan amount is 100 million yuan. The loan amount is a year-end outstanding 
figure. 
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5.4.4 Summary 
In Chapter 5, I focus on the demand analysis of farmer loans from two aspects. Firstly, I 
analyze the informal lending based on National rural fixed observation data among three 
regions. Imbalance of economy and policy inclination brought about different features of 
farmer loans in three regions. It can be concluded that farmers rely more on informal channels 
based on National data and farmers in the Western region have a higher tendency toward 
formal finance compared with farmers in the Eastern and the Middle regions. On another side, 
I analyze the farmer loans based on China Rural Finance Yearbook. By analyzing farmer loans 
from 1979 to 1989, I found out that RCCs have gradually become an important provider of 
farmer loans and farmer loans in all provinces maintain a high annual growth rate from 1979 
and 1989, which might imply the establishment of Rural Household Responsibility system 
promoted the development of rural economy. After the re-releasing of farmer loans after 2007, 
farmer loans has gradually become a focus of rural finance. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I investigated developments in  agricultural credit in China from a historical and 
macro view. I sought to achieve the following objectives: First, I sort out the political 
movements and development of rural finance sector in China from 1950 to 1984. Secondly, by 
using data from financial gazetteers, I have shown that agricultural loans and RCC loans were 
affected by policies during different periods of time. Interestingly, establishments of ABC, 
occurrence of the Great Leap Forward movement and two stages of the Cultural Revolution do 
impose positive effect on agricultural loans. And the change of steel output value imposes a 
negative effect on RCC loans during the Great Leap Forward. The simple analysis of interest 
rate elasticity of credit demand also demonstrates full elasticity might exist in some provinces, 
which challenges the tradition idea that credit demand elasticity is not elastic in China. 
Furthermore, the documentation of local financial gazetteers do provide interesting and 
valuable stories about agriculture credit in China. Thirdly, I conduct qualitative analysis on 
informal lending in three economic regions from 1986 to 2009 based on the National rural 
fixed observation data and find out that farmers rely more on informal channels and interest-
free informal lending accounts for a relatively large part of total loan demand. Fourthly, I 
conduct qualitative analysis on farmer loan per mu based on China Rural Finance yearbook. 
Farmer loans per mu maintain a growth rate of over 20% in all provinces from 1979 to 1989 
and farmer loans are mainly provided by RCCs. To sum up, China’s rural finance development 
and reform is spontaneous process that accommodates reforms in other sectors and responds to 
the economic and institutional environment. 
Due to the availability of continuous data from local financial gazetteers, I only have a chance 
to analyze the effects of different policies on agricultural credit. If more continuous and 
valuable data is collected from city-level gazetteers, more interesting stories will be revealed. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A 1 Agricultural Loan in China from 1952 to 1988 
Year 
Total 
Loans 
Agricultur
al Loans 
Change of 
Agricultur
al Loans 
Great Events in China 
1952 108 4.2  
1951 Agricultural cooperative Bank 
established 
1953 134 6.6 2.4  
1954 184.6 7.6 1  
1955 204.2 10 2.4 1955 ABC was established for the first time 
1956 233.9 30.2 20.2  
1957 277.5 27.7 -2.5 1957 ABC was abolished 
1958 477.7 43.4 15.7 "Great Leap Forward" movement carried out 
1959 798.1 44.5 1.1 
Three-year economic hardship 
1960 968.7 62.8 18.3 
1961 803.5 63.7 0.9 
1962 682.1 66.7 3 
1963 568 70.8 4.1 
1963 ABC was re-established for the second 
time 
1964 578 71.5 0.7  
1965 647.4 78.2 6.7  
1966 755.9 77.7 -0.5 
Cultural Revolution 
1967 796.6 81.4 3.7 
1968 890.3 81.2 -0.2 
1969 945.5 84 2.8 
1970 1033.4 85.1 1.1 
1971 1113.9 51.6 -33.5 
1972 1145.6 56.6 5 
1973 1269 58.8 2.2 
1974 1353.5 64 5.2 
1975 1462.7 72.4 8.4 
1976 1541.8 90.4 18 
1977 1663.3 98.3 7.9  
1978 1850 115.6 17.3 
Household Responsibility System was 
established 
1979 2039.6 136.7 21.1 ABC was re-established for the third time 
1980 2414.3 175.9 39.2  
1981 2764.6 189.7 13.8  
1982 2860.2 212.5 22.8  
1983 3180.6 231.2 18.7  
1984 3589.9 368.1 136.9  
1985 4766.1 416.6 48.5  
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1986 5905.6 570.4 153.8  
1987 9032.5 685.8 115.4  
1988 10551.3 814.2 128.4  
Table A 2 Statistics of Deposit and Loan by RCC from 1953-1988 
Year 
Total 
De 
posit 
Collective 
agricultur
e deposit 
Township    
enterpris
e deposit 
Farmers 
savings 
deposit 
Other 
deposit 
Total 
Loan 
Collective 
agricultur
e loan 
Township 
enterprise 
loan 
Farmer
s loan 
1953 0.1 0.1    0.2 0.2   
1954 1.6 1.6    1.2 1.2   
1955 6.1 6.1    3.0 3.0   
1956 10.8 6.5  4.3  10.2 4.1  6.1 
1957 20.7 13.4  7.3  9.5 4.2  5.3 
1958 40.3 20.2  20.1  24.7 13.6  11.1 
1959 45.0 24.0  21.0  22.9 16.0  6.9 
1960 43.1 27.9  15.2  22.3 12.7  9.6 
1961 47.1 30.9  16.2  17.6 9.5  8.1 
1962 28.2 18.4  9.8  15.6 7.9  7.7 
1963 31.4 21.3  10.1  13.8 5.6  8.2 
1964 42.8 32.1  10.7  14.1 4.2  9.9 
1965 48.0 35.1  12.9  13.5 3.1  10.4 
1966 60.9 46.3  14.6  15.2 3.8  11.4 
1967 73.2 59.2  14.0  14.6 3.6  11.0 
1968 75.7 59.7  16.0  16.5 4.0  12.5 
1969 73.3 58.4  14.9  17.8 4.5  13.3 
1970 76.4 61.4  15.0  18.8 5.6  13.2 
1971 90.3 64.2  17.0 9.1 19.4 6.0 0.8 12.6 
1972 90.9 61.5  20.1 9.3 21.1 7.9 1.2 12.0 
1973 104.3 67.3  27.1 10.4 20.8 7.8 1.5 11.5 
1974 121.2 78.1  30.6 12.5 22.0 10.7  11.3 
1975 135.1 85.1  35.1 14.9 26.7 15.4  11.3 
1976 141.2 89.4  36.9 14.9 35.8 17.1 7.0 11.7 
1977 151.3 89.3  46.5 15.5 39.7 18.4 9.9 11.4 
1978 166.0 93.8  55.7 16.5 45.1 21.8 12.1 11.2 
1979 215.9 98.3 21.9 78.4 17.3 47.5 22.4 14.2 10.9 
1980 272.3 105.5 29.5 117.0 20.3 81.6 34.5 31.1 16.0 
1981 319.6 113.2 29.7 169.6 7.1 96.4 35.7 35.5 25.2 
1982 389.9 121.1 33.7 228.1 7.0 121.2 34.8 42.3 44.1 
1983 487.4 91.8 62.3 319.9 13.4 163.7 28.2 60.1 75.4 
1984 624.9 89.9 81.1 438.1 15.8 354.5 38.4 135.0 181.1 
1985 724.9 71.9 72.1 564.8 16.1 400.0 41.4 164.4 194.2 
1986 962.3 83.9 91.7 766.1 20.6 568.5 44.6 265.9 258.0 
1987 1225.2 89.9 104.7 1005.7 24.9 771.4 64.5 359.3 347.6 
1988 1399.8 98.4 128.3 1142.3 30.8 908.6 80.1 456.1 372.4 
Source: Fighting 40 years, National Bureau of Statistics,1989 
Note: The unit of loan is billion yuan. 
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